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A multitude of qualitative studies describe women’s struggles to meet the 
expectations of intensive mothering with the complete commitment expected by 
employers (Hochschild 1989; Hochschild 1997; Hays 1998; Williams 2000; Blair-Loy 
2003; Stone 2007; Folbre 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between 
responsibility for reproductive labor and earnings. I ask if the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium are inherently gendered. Can women experience a gender-neutral 
breadwinner premium if they are the primary earner in the household? Similarly, do men 
experience a gender-neutral caregiver penalty when they contribute more to household 
reproductive labor than their peers?  
I begin by using data from the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
to establish that husbands in female-breadwinner households have different childcare 
patterns than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. I then 
use female-breadwinner households as a test case in my analysis of the gender pay gap by 
looking for evidence of a gender-neutral breadwinner premium. Women did experience a 
breadwinner premium, but it was lower in magnitude than the premium experienced by 
men. The premium was gendered, but both men and women experienced a penalty for 
caregiving. 
 v 
I conclude with analysis of data from an original survey experiment that 
investigates the relationship between anticipated spousal contribution to childcare and 
women’s attitudes toward their careers. The survey experiment suggests that there are at 
least two significant components to an egalitarian distribution of labor: partners must 
both contribute similar amounts of work and they must also come to an agreement on 
how tasks should be completed and meet these shared standards in their contributions. 
These analyses allow me to enter the debate about the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium.  
 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................x 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................1 
Chapter 2: Female-Breadwinner Households and the Division of Reproductive Labor
.......................................................................................................................10 
Introduction ............................................................................................................10 
Review of Literature ..............................................................................................11 
Breadwinning Status .....................................................................................17 
The Current Analysis ....................................................................................18 
Methods..................................................................................................................20 
Data and Sample ...........................................................................................20 
Modeling and Variables ................................................................................21 
Matching and Weights ..................................................................................26 
Modeling .......................................................................................................27 
Results ....................................................................................................................28 
Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation ............................................28 
Husbands’ Childcare Involvement ................................................................30 
Discussion ..............................................................................................................34 
Chapter 3: The Household Division of Labor and Mother’s Earnings ..................48 
Introduction ............................................................................................................48 
Background ............................................................................................................50 
Human Capital Explanations ........................................................................52 
Doing Gender Explanations ..........................................................................54 
Discrimination Explanations .........................................................................55 
 vii 
Methods..................................................................................................................60 
Data and Sample ...........................................................................................60 
Variables and Controls ..................................................................................61 
Matching .......................................................................................................66 
Modeling .......................................................................................................68 
Results ....................................................................................................................69 
Change in Wife’s Earnings ...........................................................................69 
Change in Husband’s Earnings .....................................................................72 
Discussion ..............................................................................................................75 
Chapter 4: Women’s Career Attitudes and Anticipated Childcare Support ..........91 
Introduction ............................................................................................................91 
Review of Literature ..............................................................................................93 
Plans and Expectations for Future Relationships..........................................96 
Hypotheses ....................................................................................................98 
Methods................................................................................................................100 
Sample.........................................................................................................101 
Screener, Prompt, and Manipulations .........................................................102 
Measures .....................................................................................................103 
Results ..................................................................................................................105 
Career Attachment Scale.............................................................................105 
Career Aspirations Scale .............................................................................107 
Robustness Checks......................................................................................108 
Discussion ............................................................................................................109 
Chapter 5: Conclusion..........................................................................................119 
Overview .....................................................................................................119 
Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Work ............................123 
 viii 
Appendix 1: Experimental Prompt ......................................................................127 
Prompt Template .........................................................................................127 
Condition 1: High Amount, High Quality ..................................................128 
Condition 2: High Amount, Low Quality ...................................................128 
Condition 3: High Amount, No Quality .....................................................129 
Condition4: Low Amount, High Quality ....................................................129 
Condition 5: Low Amount, Low Quality ....................................................130 
Condition 6: Low Amount, No Quality ......................................................130 
Condition 7: No Amount, High Quality .....................................................131 
Condition 8: No Amount, Low Quality ......................................................131 
Condition 9: No Amount, No Quality.........................................................132 
Appendix 2: Survey Instrument ...........................................................................133 
References ............................................................................................................136 
 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife’s Income ..39 
Table 2.2: Means and Distributions by Female-Breadwinner Status ....................40 
Table 2.3: Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation Mixed Effects Logit ...41 
Table 2.4: Husband’s Childcare Involvement Mixed Effects Regression .............42 
Table 3.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife’s Income ..79 
Table 3.2: Means by Female-Breadwinner Status .................................................80 
Table 3.3: Wife’s Log Earnings Mixed Effects Regression, 12-Month Lag .........81 
Table 3.4: Husband’s Log Earnings Mixed Effect Regression, 12-Month Lag ....82 
Table 3.5: Crosstabs for Husband’s Tenure and Reduced Labor Force Participation
...........................................................................................................83 
Table 3.6: Crosstabs for Husband’s Tenure and Childcare Involvement ..............83 
Table 4.1: Means and Proportions for Scales and Demographic Characteristics 114 
Table 4.2: Career Attitudes Regressed on Anticipated Amount and Quality of 
Childcare .........................................................................................115 
 x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual model of variables and effects. ...........................................6 
Figure1.2: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 2. .............7 
Figure 1.3: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 3. ............8 
Figure 1.4: Conceptual model of variable sand relationships in Chapter 4. ............9 
Figure 2.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife’s Occupation, and Husband’s Reduced 
Labor Force Participation. ................................................................43 
Figure 2.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Occupation, and Husband’s 
Reduced Labor Force Participation. .................................................44 
Figure 2.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force 
Participation, and Husband’s Childcare Involvement. .....................45 
Figure 2.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife’s Occupation, and Husband’s Childcare 
Involvement ......................................................................................46 
Figure 2.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Occupation, and Husband’s 
Childcare Involvement ......................................................................47 
Figure 3.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force 
Participation, and Change in Earnings: .............................................84 
Figure 3.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force 
Participation, and Change in Earnings ..............................................85 
Figure 3.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Involvement, and Change in 
Wife’s Earnings. ...............................................................................86 
Figure 3.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Involvement, and Change in 
Husband’s Earnings. .........................................................................87 
Figure 3.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Occupation, and Change in Earnings .....88 
 xi 
Figure 3.6 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings as Percent .........89 
Figure 3.7 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings in Dollars .........90 
Figure 4.1: Experimental Conditions ...................................................................116 
Figure 4.2 Career Attitudes Scale Questions. ......................................................116 
Figure 4.3 Effect of Quantity and Quality on Attachment Scale .........................117 
Figure 4.4 Effects of Quantity and Quality on Aspiration Scale .........................118 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The gender pay gap is hotly debated in both popular culture and sociological and 
economic research. Choice rhetoric positions the gender pay gap as the result of choices 
made by individuals and encourages women to find ways to “lean in” at work and 
specialize in more lucrative fields to compete with their male peers. Focusing on 
individual decisions and outcomes obscures the structural and systematic impediments 
women face in the workplace and in the home. Motherhood is a status characteristic—a 
quality that produces biased evaluations of an individual’s performance when relevant, 
including lower salary recommendations, harsher standards for work commitment, and 
higher standards for perceived competency (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Because 
organizations assume women hold primary responsibility for reproductive labor, women 
are marginalized in the workplace and valued less by organizations than their “more 
committed” male peers. Women’s perceived “strained commitment” is exacerbated once 
they have children because employers assume mothers will respond to the increased 
demands of parenthood by shifting their priorities away from the workplace and toward 
the needs of their children (Blair-Loy 2003). The opposite is true for men who employers 
assume become more attached to paid work after having children. 
Women’s primary responsibility for reproductive labor pushes them out of high-
pressure, white-collar careers at a greater rate than men (Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; 
Cha 2013). Williams (2000) calls this the “maternal wall” that prevents mothers with 
reproductive labor responsibilities from conforming to a 40-, 50-, or 60-plus hour per 
week schedule because they lack support at home. Middle-class women who attempt to 
balance their work and life commitments by reducing their work hours or using other 
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flexibility policies often find themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the 
“mommy track,” or pushed out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 
2003; Stone 2007; Stone and Ackerly 2013). Budig and England (2001) demonstrate that 
the wage penalty experienced by mothers persists after controlling for human capital and 
demographic characteristics. Women’s earnings decrease when they have children while 
men’s earnings tend to increase when they have children because men benefit from 
women’s unpaid labor at home (Budig and England 2001; Folbre 2001; Gornick and 
Meyers 2003; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2010). These effects are called the 
motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium.  
In this dissertation, I focus on the relationship between responsibility for 
reproductive labor and earnings. Specifically, I am interested in how men’s contributions 
to reproductive labor in the home impact the motherhood penalty and fatherhood 
premium experienced by men and women, respectively (Figure 1.1). I ask if the 
motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium are inherently gendered. Can women 
experience a gender-neutral breadwinner premium if they are the primary earner in the 
household? Similarly, do men experience a gender-neutral caregiver penalty when they 
contribute more to household reproductive labor than their peers? I build on the body of 
research describing the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium by investigating 
female-breadwinner households as a test case for finding evidence of a gender-neutral 
breadwinner-premium and caregiver penalty.  
I present three analyses in this dissertation that address different aspects of the 
relationship between men’s contributions to childcare and men’s and women’s earnings. 
Two of the analyses use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (2008 
SIPP), a nationally representative, longitudinal, household-level survey. The first wave 
took place in 2008 and respondents were surveyed every four months until 2013, yielding 
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a total of five years and four months of data. Researchers selected an initial sample of 
households for the first wave and interviewed all members of the household. For 
subsequent waves, researchers re-interviewed all household members including new 
residents. If a respondent moved out of the original household and into a new household, 
researchers followed that respondent. Some core questions were asked once each wave, 
but other questions asked participants to retrospectively report over smaller increments of 
time. For example, participants were asked to report their income for each of the previous 
months and to report their employment status for each of the previous weeks since the 
last survey. 
The second data source was an original survey experiment developed for this 
dissertation to look at the relationship between husband’s contributions to childcare and 
women’s attitudes toward their careers. I recruited nearly 1,500 young (age 18-32), 
unmarried, childless women living in the United States using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. I focused on the experiences of women because their careers and career attitudes 
are the most affected by partner contributions to childcare. I asked participants to read a 
short vignette that described a future scenario where they were married and had children. 
I varied both the quality and amount of childcare that their partners contributed in the 
initial description. After reading this vignette, the women answered questions about their 
career attachment and career aspirations in the given scenario. 
Chapter 2 uses data from the 2008 SIPP to look at husband’s contributions to 
childcare in female-breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households (Figure 
1.2). This is the first of the two chapters that use female-breadwinner households as a test 
case for observing a gender-neutral caregiver penalty and breadwinner premium. I set the 
foundation for the dissertation in this chapter by investigating and identifying differences 
between husband’s contributions to childcare in the two groups of households. I focus on 
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two indicators of men’s contributions to childcare: husband’s reduced labor force 
participation to care for children and men’s day-to-day involvement in their children’s 
lives.  
The third chapter continues using 2008 SIPP data and focuses specifically on the 
motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Figure 1.3). I tie together the themes from 
the previous chapter by looking at the relationship between husband’s contributions to 
childcare and wives’ and husbands’ subsequent earnings. I investigate if the fatherhood 
premium and motherhood penalty are inherently gendered or if we can detect a gender-
neutral breadwinner premium and caregiver penalty in cases where women act as the 
primary breadwinner for the household.  
In the final substantive chapter, I continue work of the previous two chapters by 
looking at the relationship between anticipated partner support for childcare and women’s 
career attitudes (Figure 1.4). I build on research that looks at couple’s division of 
childcare by separating childcare into two components: the amount of childcare 
contributed and the quality of the childcare provided. Ethnographic and interview 
accounts of women’s experiences with childcare describe both their frustrations when 
their partners refuse to share responsibility for childcare and their dissatisfaction with the 
quality of care that their partners provide (Hochschild 1989, Blair-Loy 2003, Stone 
2007). Both of these factors increased women’s responsibilities for reproductive labor 
and interfered with their ability to manage the competing demands of work and home. 
This experiment addresses a potential critique of the previous two chapters, namely that 
the relationships I observed between men’s contributions to childcare, household 
structure, and individual earnings were the result of self-selection that I cannot account 
for. The experiment demonstrates that the link between men’s contributions to childcare 
and women’s careers persists after random assignment.  
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In these analyses, I first establish that husbands in female-breadwinner 
households have different childcare patterns than their counterparts in male-breadwinner 
and equal-earner households. I then use female-breadwinner households as a test case in 
my analysis of the gender pay gap by looking for evidence that women can experience a 
breadwinner premium. I conclude by investigating the relationship between anticipated 
spousal contribution to childcare and women’s attitudes toward their careers. These 
analyses allow me to enter the debate about the motherhood penalty and fatherhood 
premium.  
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual model of variables and effects. 
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Figure1.2: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual model of variables and relationships in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 1.4: Conceptual model of variable sand relationships in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 2: FEMALE-BREADWINNER HOUSEHOLDS AND THE 
DIVISION OF REPRODUCTIVE LABOR 
 
Introduction 
Although women’s labor force participation patterns increasingly mirror those of 
men, the gender pay gap persists in the form of the motherhood penalty and the 
fatherhood premium. Women are more likely than men to make career sacrifices to care 
for children (Stone 2007; Cha 2013), and men benefit from women’s time and work at 
home and are better able to advance their own careers and earning potential as a result. 
Married women also benefit from men’s increased earning power, but upon divorce 
women often stop receiving financial returns for their investments (in the form of 
reproductive labor) in their husbands’ careers.1 Single mothers face an increased risk of 
experiencing poverty as a result (Williams 2000). Women’s lost earning power also 
negatively affects their children because women are more likely to receive custody of 
children in a divorce or to care for them after the dissolution of a relationship (Williams 
2000). Income transfers like child support and alimony fail to replace the full financial 
support of a father, and children are left to rely on the incomes of mothers who face 
discrimination in the paid labor force and whose earnings potential has been curtailed by 
responsibility for childcare and other household reproductive labor. 
Family and work researchers have theorized extensively about the gender gap in 
pay and its relationship to reproductive labor (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995; 
England, Hermsen, and Cotter 2000; Budig and England 2001; England, Budig, and 
                                                 
1 Reproductive labor comprises the activities and relationships that maintain people both in daily life and 
from generation to generation (Glenn 1992). It encompasses daily chores like cooking and childcare as well 
as less structured activities like emotional work in maintaining family relationships and continuing cultural 
and ethnic traditions. 
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Folbre 2002; Gornick and Meyers 2003). Parts of the gap are explained by employer 
preferences and discrimination (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007), women’s greater 
likelihood to take time off from their work or reduce their work hours in the paid labor 
force (Budig and England 2001), and women’s lower levels of specialized human capital 
(Tam 1997). Underlying each of these explanations is women’s perceived and/or actual 
greater responsibility for reproductive labor in the home.  
I look at the case of female-breadwinner households, heterosexual couples where 
the wife earns a majority of the couple’s combined income. The 2010 Census shows that 
the proportion of female-breadwinner households is increasing as the United States 
moves out of the economic recession (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). Mothers are the 
only or primary breadwinner in 40% of households with children under age 18, of which 
15% are in married couples and 25% are single or cohabitating mothers. These 
households break the “traditionally” defined gender responsibilities within the home by 
having a female breadwinner. I investigate if the division of household reproductive labor 
in female-breadwinner households differs from the division of labor in non-female 
breadwinner households? I use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program participation to 
compare husband’s likelihood of reducing labor force participation for childcare and 
husband’s involvement in childcare in both categories of households.  
 
Review of Literature 
Hochschild (1989) described a stalled revolution in which women have increased 
their labor force attachment to increasingly mirror that of men, while men’s contributions 
to reproductive labor have also grown but have fallen short of parity with women’s share. 
There is a consensus in research on childcare time showing that, although men’s 
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childcare time has increased in recent decades, women still spend significantly more time 
on housework and childcare tasks than men (Coltrane 2000; Williams 2000; Stone 2007; 
Maume 2011). Since the 1960s, women’s time spent on housework (excluding childcare 
tasks) has been halved while men’s has doubled (Bianchi et al 2000). During this same 
period, both women and men have increased their time spent on childcare (Bianchi 
2000). Several studies suggest that not all of men’s increased childcare time relieves the 
strain women experience in balancing work and family. Much of the increase in men’s 
childcare time is on weekends, not on weekdays when women experience the greatest 
time constraints (Connelly and Kimmel 2010; Maume 2011). Furthermore, women are 
three times more likely than their male partners to provide emergency childcare during 
the workweek (Maume 2008). Men are also reluctant to use workplace flexibility policies 
designed to facilitate childcare for fear of suffering negative career consequences 
(Williams 2010; Coltrane et al. 2013). These trends suggest that, although men have 
increased their time spent with children, men are less willing to deviate from ideal worker 
norms to provide childcare. 
Both men and women report preferring an egalitarian division of labor at home 
with both couples working for pay and splitting home maintenance and childcare tasks 
equally (Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). Men and women report wanting to 
spend less time working and more time caring for children or pursuing leisure activities 
(Williams 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Williams 2010). When men have control of 
their workweek schedules, their childcare time increases (Maume 2011). This suggests 
that men work to actualize their egalitarian preferences when they have fewer structural 
constraints on their time. These egalitarian preferences are hampered, however, by the 
demanding and inflexible requirements of employers. The United States lags behind other 
developed nations in flexibility and family-friendly workplace policies (Gornick and 
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Meyer 2003; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Pettit and Hook 2009; Budig, Misra, and 
Boeckmann 2010; Milkman and Applebaum 2013). While policies facilitating work-life 
balance are treated more like rights in many European countries and mandated by the 
government, it is up to employers in the United States to offer flexibility policies as job 
perks.  
High-status managerial and professional employees often have access to a variety 
of leave and flexibility policies. Stone (2007), Blair-Loy (2003), and Hochschild (1997) 
describe women’s experiences with balancing work and family responsibilities. The 
companies that these men and women worked for had policies for parental leave, part-
time or reduced scheduling, and compressed workweeks. Many of these companies were 
even recognized in industry and broader media as “family-friendly” and a good place for 
new parents to work. However, when the mothers tried to use these policies, they often 
faced one of two outcomes. The mother’s request for flexibility was denied outright and 
their managers insisted that the mother come back to work after her parental leave with 
the same number of hours and the same rigid schedule as before having a baby. 
Alternatively, the manger accepted the mother’s request for a schedule modification but 
the woman’s status at work and the quality of her assignments suffered after she signaled 
her divided commitment. The fact that policies exist in company policy and in human 
resource manuals is far from a guarantee that employees have access to these policies or 
that these policies are compatible with workplace culture. 
Employees recognize manager reluctance to grant leave and flexibility policies 
and perceive consequences for even asking about altering their work schedule. 
Professionals are more likely than workers in other occupations to overwork with 
schedules of 60 or more hours each week (Cha 2010). Women in these occupations 
seeking to work “part-time” after having children may only be requesting a 40 hour a 
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week schedule (Hochschild 1997; Stone 2007). Stone and Hernandez (2013) describe 
how professional women who moved to part-time positions and faced negative 
consequences at work internalized what Blair-Loy (2003) calls the work-devotion schema 
which demands complete dedication in the workplace. The “part-time” women accepted 
their decreased status at the office as what they deserved for scaling back their work 
hours, even when their reduced schedules still met or exceeded the standard for full-time 
work. 
Men are especially reluctant to signal divided loyalties at work by requesting an 
adjusted schedule to take care of family needs (Williams 2010; Coltrane et al. 2013). 
Professional men perceive that their careers will be derailed because requesting schedule 
modification is a gender-incongruent activity—the men are not only signaling that they 
have responsibilities outside of their career, they are deviating from the masculine norm 
of the breadwinner and the career man. Williams (2010) reviews union arbitration cases 
that show how men in low-wage jobs who had crises of care were reluctant to reveal the 
reason for their need to take a day off or leave work early. These men were dedicated to 
their family care responsibilities and their union jobs would have allowed the absence or 
early leave time if they provided a reason, but the men jeopardized their jobs because 
they were unwilling to tell their supervisor that they needed to take care of a sick child or 
to go to the hospital to visit a dying relative. 
Although a variety of leave and scheduling policies are available to managerial 
and professional employees and to a lesser extent to union members, un-unionized low-
wage workers are less likely to have access to these benefits (Williams 2000; Williams 
2010; Williams et al. 2013; Correll et al. 2014). Lambert (2008) argues that the meaning 
of flexibility changes in the context of low-wage work. For workers at the top of the 
wage scale, flexibility refers to their ability to change work to fit family. But in the 
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context of low-wage work, flexibility is used to describe the ability of businesses to 
rapidly adjust scheduling to maximize profit. Managers use a variety of techniques such 
as last-minute scheduling, on-call shifts, lack of maximum or minimum hours, and 
nonstandard scheduling to rapidly adjust their staffing according to demand and thus 
reduce operating costs. This transfers risk onto hourly-workers. Mangers operate 
according to Blair-Loy’s (2003) work-devotion schema and hold low-wage workers to 
the same standards of dedication. Low-wage workers are even less able to meet the 
requirements of the work devotion schema because they lack the financial resources to 
outsource their childcare and housework responsibilities. Managers, however, view the 
inevitable tardiness and absences as sign of the worker’s moral failing and justification 
for termination (Correll et al. 2014).  
Low wage jobs, especially service occupations, are frequently characterized by 
irregular schedules with hours that differ from day to day and week to week (Lambert 
2008). Professionals and managers occupations are more likely to offer access to 
flexibility options and paid leave as part of their benefits package at their job (Williams, 
Blair-Loy and Berdahl 2013). However, professionals and managerial occupations are 
also more likely to require long hours and expect their employees to overwork (Cha 
2010). Clawson and Gerstel (2014) described this disparity between high-wage 
professional workers and lower wage non-professional workers in their study of 
healthcare workers. Although all of the healthcare workers were required to work 
irregular hours, doctors and nurses, the two occupations with the highest pay and most 
prestige, had significantly more say in the timing and number of their work hours 
compared to EMTs and nursing assistants.  
Workers at the top of the wage scale recognize that they face sharp career 
consequences for using leave and flexibility policies while workers at the bottom have 
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few policies or benefits available for them to use. This perception of the workplace as 
inflexible and hostile to family has shaped how young men and women anticipate 
structuring their intimate partnerships and building families. In her interviews with young 
men and women, Gerson (2011) finds that most men and women would prefer egalitarian 
partnerships where both partners share responsibility for childrearing/housework and 
financial support. However, men and women perceive that they will likely be unable to 
actualize these egalitarian partnerships and develop fallback positions. Women fear being 
trapped by the confines of marriage and the workplace and were most likely to report 
self-reliance as their second choice and would rather maintain financial dependence even 
if this means foregoing long-term partnerships. Men, however, were more likely to prefer 
a neo-traditional fallback arrangement where they are the primary breadwinner and their 
partner may work for pay but is primarily responsible for childcare and housework. 
Pedulla and Thébaud (2015) conducted an experimental study using Gerson’s premise of 
workplace constraints impacting preferences for particular arrangements. They concluded 
that workplace arrangements do affect men and women’s anticipated structuring of 
family responsibilities and that an inflexible workplace hinders the adoption of a gender 
egalitarian division of labor in the household. 
The common argument in these structural explanations for the gender disparity in 
childcare time is that a 40-plus hour schedule and open schedule availability are 
incompatible with childcare and other family needs. Men and women would like to more 
evenly divide work and family care responsibilities. Women’s increasing presence in the 
workforce has been encouraged (or even necessitated) by the increased earnings, control 
over income, and status that comes with a job. But the revolution at home has stalled 
because men frequently risk losing status at work and decreasing their earning power and 
career opportunities by contributing more equally at home. 
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BREADWINNING STATUS 
Despite the fall of the family wage that allowed a segment of the population to 
achieve middle-class status with only the man’s income, breadwinning is still linked to 
masculinity for many men (Townsend 2002; Anderson 1997; Gerson 1993). Men and 
women react differently to economic dependency within relationships, and these 
reactions impact the distribution of power between partners. Maume (2011) found that 
men in female-breadwinner households spend more time engaged in childcare and 
attributed this to women’s increased power within the relationship, but that their levels of 
childcare did not match those of women male-breadwinner households. Women who out 
earn their partners continue to take responsibility for housework and childcare, 
supporting their femininity and their partner’s masculinity (Tichenor 2005). Highly 
educated women spend more time in a variety of types of childcare, ranging from 
enrichment activities to basic care, than women with less education despite the fact that 
these highly educated women are more likely to be employed and to be employed full 
time (England and Srivastava 2013). Raley et al. (2012) calls this practice gate keeping. 
They note, however, women in dual-earner couples face time constraints, especially when 
the women are employed full time, which creates more opportunities and more pressure 
for the men in these couples to contribute to childcare.  
When considering the relationship between household economics and power, we 
must consider that money does not have a constant meaning (Zelizer 2007). The 
relationship between income and relationship power is mediated by gender, and the 
balance of power within a relationship does not always shift in favor of the woman when 
she out earns her male partner (Bittman et al. 2003; Greenstein 2000; Brines 1994; 
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Potuchek 1992). Tichenor (2005) attempts to explain why women’s breadwinning does 
not afford them the same power that it does men by arguing that the link between power 
and money is trumped by the link between power and masculinity in traditional gender 
ideologies. Brines (1994) suggests that men will sometimes react to financial dependence 
by redefining the source of their masculinity and contribution to the relationship. England 
and Srivastava (2013) found that, while education increased women’s time spent caring 
for children, the same was not true of men, except for men who are not employed full-
time. For these men who are unemployed or who work part time, education is positively 
associated with childcare time, allowing for the possibility that these men have a non-
traditional gender ideology and are reducing their labor force participation or opting out 
of the paid labor force entirely to focus on child care.  
The norm of involved fatherhood makes it more acceptable and even encourages 
men to be a good husband and father, not by financially supporting his wife and kids, but 
by providing day-to-day care for their children. Furthermore, in the case of husbands 
reducing their labor force participation, the couples have made a decision to temporarily 
focus on the wife’s career, either out of financial necessity or because of the couple’s 
preference (and financial ability) for the husband to temporarily stay home with their 
children.  
 
THE CURRENT ANALYSIS 
I focus on female-breadwinner households as a site for examining gender 
divisions of childcare because it provides a case that flips the traditionally defined role of 
breadwinner. In this paper, I look at how the division of childcare differs in female-
breadwinner and male-breadwinner/equal-earner couples. Debate exists surrounding how 
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men react to financial dependence on a female partner. However, like women, men report 
wanting to spend more time with their children (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Norms of 
intensive parenting are increasingly requiring more involvement from fathers (Hays 
1998). Therefore, I expect that:  
 
H1. Husbands in female-breadwinner households will be more likely to have ever 
reduced their labor force participation for childcare than husbands in male-
breadwinner and equal-earner households 
H2. Husbands in female-breadwinner households will have higher levels of 
involvement with children than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner 
households. 
 
When considering the differences between female-breadwinner and male-
breadwinner/equal-earner couples, it is important to consider the threat of endogeneity to 
the validity of my models. Husbands could decide to work part time or to drop out of the 
labor force, not because wives have better career prospects than them, but because these 
husbands have low productivity or non-cognitive skills overall compared to other 
husbands. I use coarsened exact matching to ensure that I compared female-breadwinner 
and male-breadwinner/equal-earner couples with similar observable characteristics.2 
However, differences between the two categories of couples in earnings, husband’s 
decision to reduce labor force participation for childcare, and other variables could stem 
from unmeasured factors. I made efforts to control for a number of individual- and 
                                                 
2 The sample weights in this analysis come from matching on wives’ characteristics. I also tested models 
using sample weights that matched on the husband’s and on both partners’ characteristics. All models 
produced similar results. 
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couple-level demographic and human capital variables and to create matching weights 
based on these controls to minimize the threat of unobservable characteristics to validity.  
 
Methods 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
For this analysis, I used the 2008-2013 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (2008 SIPP), a large, nationally representative, household-level panel study. 
The data consists of 16 waves spanning 4 months each for a total of 5 years and 4 months 
of observations. In addition to the core survey questionnaire, I also included questions 
from the Child Well-Being and Child Care Modules.  
Within the 2008 SIPP, I limited the sample to heterosexual, married couples. 
While the 2008 SIPP data allowed for identifying cohabiting heterosexual couples and 
same-sex married or cohabiting couples, I choose to focus on heterosexual married 
couples. Although the 2008 SIPP is a large dataset, it did not include a sufficient number 
of married or cohabiting same-sex couples for analysis. I limited the sample to married 
couples because marriage indicates long-term relationship planning so the couples are 
likely to have discussed the division of responsibility for earning money and caring for 
children. I further restricted the sample to couples with at least one child under the age of 
18 in residence. For couples who become parents during the panel, I include them starting 
the first month after the birth or adoption of their child. For couples whose youngest child 
turns 18 and ages out of the SIPP cutoff for being classified as a child, I include them 
through the month of their child’s 18th birthday. I also excluded couples where one 
spouse was unemployed for more than half the months they were included in the survey. I 
wanted to focus on dual-income couples but to allow for seasonal employment or 
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temporary spells of unemployment. Finally, I restricted the sample to couples where both 
partners were surveyed and lived in the same household. It was not possible to create 
measures of relative income for couples with only one partner in the survey because the 
2008 SIPP did not collect detailed financial information on non-residents. Furthermore, 
married couples that live apart are likely to have different childcare requirements and 
methods of dividing responsibility for children than cohabiting married couples. The final 
sample included 5,580 married couples observed for a maximum of 64 months. 
 
MODELING AND VARIABLES 
The first set of models examined at the relationship between female-breadwinner 
status and if the husband had reduced his labor force participation to care for children. 
This primary dependent variable was husband’s reduced labor force participation, a 
dummy variable indicating whether the husband had ever reduced his labor force 
participation to care for children. The 2008 SIPP contained two questions that asked if 
participants had worked part time or not worked. If participants answered yes to either, 
they received a follow up question that asked the reason for working part time or not 
working. One of the answer choices was “taking care of children.” I considered if the 
husband had ever reduced his labor force participation rather than if he was currently 
working part time or not working because even temporary childcare arrangements, 
especially those soon after birth and in early childhood, can have long lasting impacts on 
the division of household labor (Milkman and Applebaum 2013). 
The second set of models examined the impact of female-breadwinner status on 
the husband’s involvement in childcare. The dependent variable was husband’s childcare 
involvement. I created this scale by totaling the scores of three items: (1) the number of 
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days each week the husband ate breakfast with each child; (2) the number of days each 
week the husband ate dinner with each child; and (3) the number of times the husband 
talked or played with the child for five or more minutes. These questions were asked for 
each child in the household under the age of 18. The scale ranged from zero to 18, with 
lower values indicating low or no involvement from the husband and higher values 
indicating high levels of involvement. I considered the average score on the scale across 
all children and the highest score on the scale. Both methods produced similar results, 
and the models presented here used the average score across all children. 
Although this scale is an imperfect indicator of husband’s contributions to 
childcare because it does not account for all of the care that children require, nor does it 
account for the emotional labor that goes into caring for children, it is a useful scale for 
this analysis because it captures the types of care that men are most likely to perform 
(Connelly and Kimmell 2010). Men are more likely to spend their childcare time either 
passively caring for children or engaging in fun activities with children. Passive childcare 
occurs when the parent and child are in the same vicinity so that the parent is monitoring 
the child, but the parent and child are not necessarily directly interacting. Sharing a meal 
with a child is an example of childcare that could be either active or passive. Men are also 
more likely to spend their childcare time engaging in a fun activity with children like 
playing a game or reading a book instead of more routine types of care like supervising 
homework or getting children ready for bed. That the scale captures these more passive 
and fun forms of childcare means that the estimate of husbands’ actual childcare 
involvement is liberal. 
The primary independent variable of interest was female breadwinner status, a 
dummy variable indicating if the wife earns 70% or more of the couple’s combined 
income. I tested models with several cutoffs for relative income, including the wife 
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earning 60% and 80% of the couple’s total earnings. The 70% cut point produced the best 
balance between selecting couples where the wife earned a significant majority of the 
couple’s combined earnings and maintaining a large enough sample of female-
breadwinner households for analysis. Results for the 60% cut point were similar to those 
presented in these tables, but the 80% cut point was too restrictive for this sample and 
produced too few female-breadwinner couples for analysis. In the first wave of the 
sample, slightly more than 18% of the sample consisted of female-breadwinner 
households. The 2008 SIPP tracked households during the Great Recession, which may 
have yielded a larger sample of female-breadwinner households than we would expect in 
a non-recession period. Nearly half of the couples were female-breadwinner at some 
point during the time they were surveyed, and slightly more than half of the sample 
changed their female-breadwinner status at least once during the course of the survey. 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of female-breadwinner households by income. Female-
breadwinner households were fairly evenly distributed by wife’s income.3 Couples who 
changed breadwinner-status were fairly evenly distributed across income categories. This 
suggests that female-breadwinner status is not correlated with wife’s income or couple’s 
income for this sample. Female-breadwinner households represent a status that may or 
may not change over time and not a static household formation.  
[Insert Table 2.1] 
The models included controls for several couple and individual level 
characteristics (Table 2.2). Number of older children is a count of the number of the 
couple’s children age 10 to 17 that lived in the household during the survey period. Both 
female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had an average of .7 
                                                 
3 I also investigated distribution of female-breadwinner households by total family income and by 
husband’s income. Female-breadwinner households were similarly evenly distributed in both cases. 
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older children living in the household.4 Number of young children is a count of the 
number of the couple’s children under age 10 that lived in the household during the 
survey period. All couples in the sample had at least one older or younger child, and I 
coded both variables to create a cap of eight. Again, female breadwinner and equal-
earner/male-breadwinner couples had similar averages for the number of young children 
in the household with 1.1 and 1.2 children, respectively. Region is a categorical indicator 
for geographic location. Most of the couples lived in the South (33%), followed by the 
West (25%), Midwest (23%), and Northeast (19%). This distribution was similar for both 
categories of couples. 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
 Age is continuous for both wives and husbands. The average age in female 
breadwinner couples was 38.7 for wives and 41.8 for husbands. This was similar to the 
averages for equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples where the average age was 38.2 
for wives and 40.5 for husbands. I also included age squared to check for possible non-
linear relationship between age and husband’s childcare contributions. Occupation in the 
2008 SIPP used 2002 Census Occupation Codes. I divided occupations into six 
categories: professional/managerial, technical, service, sales, clerical, and blue-
collar/manufacturing. The distribution for wives’ occupations was mostly similar across 
the two categories of households, with the exception of clerical occupations; wives in 
female-breadwinner households were less likely to work in clerical occupations than 
wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households. There was less similarity in the 
distribution of husbands’ occupations. Husbands in female-breadwinner households were 
more likely to work in a professional occupation and less likely to work in a blue-
                                                 
4 Descriptive statistics are provided for the final sample of couples who were matched with coarsened exact 
matching. The matching process is discussed in further detail in the section on matching and weights. 
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collar/manufacturing occupation than husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
households.  
Job tenure is a continuous measurement of the number of years the person has 
spent working in the same job. I created it by subtracting the starting date of the job from 
the interview month and year. The average length of tenure was a bit over six years for 
both husbands and wives. Wives and husbands in female-breadwinner couples had 
slightly longer tenures than their counterparts in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
couples with a difference of a just less than five months. Work hours is a continuous 
measure of the average number of hours worked each week in the last month. Wives from 
both categories of household had similar averages for work hours at around 37 hours per 
week. Husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households had slightly longer 
work hours at 42 hours per week compared to 40 hours for husbands in female-
breadwinner households. Education was measured using 16 categories in the 2008 SIPP. 
I reduced the number of categories to four: less than high school, high school graduate, 
some college, and college graduate. Both categories of couples had similar education 
levels. For wives, 38% had a college degree, 36% had some college, 19% had graduated 
high school, and 6% had not completed high school. For husbands, 29% had a college 
degree, 34% had some college, 27% had graduated high school, and 10% had not 
completed high school. Race is divided into four categories: white, Black, Asian or 
Other, and Hispanic/Latino. The distribution for both wives’ and husbands’ race was 
similar across female-breadwinner and equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples. For 
wives, 72% were white, 7% were Black, 12% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were 
Asian or other. For husbands, 70% were white, 7% were Black, 14% were Hispanic or 
Latino, and 9% were Asian or other. 
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MATCHING AND WEIGHTS 
I addressed the potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to 
husband’s contributions by using coarsened exact matching. This method allowed me to 
compare wives in female-breadwinner households to wives in equal-earner and male-
breadwinner households who were similar in salient characteristics. Matching techniques 
“prune observations from the data so that the remaining data have better balance between 
the treated and the control groups, meaning that the empirical distribution of the 
covariates (X) in the groups are more similar” (Blackwell et al. 2009). Coarsened exact 
matching differs from other types of matching like propensity score matching because it 
only requires that the data is temporarily put into similar segments and matched between 
the control and treated group. This process produces a sampling weight that can be 
applied to the original, uncoarsened data. This is especially useful for continuous 
measures like job tenure and age because CEM will temporarily group these measures 
into segments to produce sampling weights, transforming them from continuous to 
categorical, but the sampling weights can then be applied to the original continuous 
variable in regression models. I matched on the wife’s characteristics because my 
research questions depend on the husband’s special characteristics differing from his 
counterparts in the equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples, in this case, his increased 
involvement to childcare and decreased commitment to paid work.5  
In this analysis, male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples were the untreated 
group and female-breadwinner households were the treated group. I used CEM to match 
the treated and untreated groups on wife’s education, race, occupation, and job tenure as 
well as the couple’s number of children age 10 to 17 and number of children under age 
                                                 
5 I also tested models using sample weights that matched on the husband’s and on both partners’ 
characteristics. All three models produced similar results to the models presented here. 
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10 and geographic region of residence. One benefit of the CEM command used for 
coarsened exact matching is the ability to define how the data is coarsened for variables 
with theoretical meaningful cut points. I specified cut points for education (less than high 
school, finished high school, some college, and college graduate), number of children age 
10 to 17, and number of children under age 10 (1, 2, and 3 or more children). I allowed 
the CEM command to determine cut points for the remaining variables. I applied the 
CEM weights to both model sets.  
 
MODELING 
I produced both set of models using mixed effects techniques.  In the models, race 
used random effects and the remaining variables used fixed effects (husband’s reduced 
labor force participation, husband’s childcare contributions, female-breadwinner status, 
number of younger children, number of older children, region, age, occupation, work 
hours, and job tenure). The first set used a mixed effects logit model and the second set 
used a mixed effects regression model. The first model uses logistic regression because 
the dependent variable is binary. Mixed effects models allow for both fixed effects for 
factors like race that remain constant across the duration of the longitudinal analysis and 
mixed effects for factors like job tenure that might change one or more times during the 
panel. Mixed effects controls for the intra-subject correlation, making it useful for 
longitudinal data where the same individual has repeated measures over the life of the 
panel.  
I present nested models, each adding additional controls and interactions to the 
base model. For both model sets, model 1 was the base model without interaction effects. 
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Subsequent models added interactions between female-breadwinner status and other 
variables. 
 
Results 
The primary aim of this analysis is to identify how the division of childcare in 
female-breadwinner households differs from the division in male-breadwinner and equal-
earner households. I start by describing husbands’ reduced labor force participation for 
childcare in the two categories of households in the first set of models. The second set of 
models examines how husband’s involvement in childcare differs between the two 
groups. 
 
HUSBAND’S REDUCED LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
The first model set looks at the relationship between husband’s reduced labor 
force participation for childcare and female-breadwinner households. Table 2.3 presents 
mixed effects logit models with sample weights from coarsened exact matching. Model 1 
regressed husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare on female-
breadwinner status and human capital and demographic variables.6 Model 2 added an 
interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and occupation for both wives and 
husbands. These tables contain the exponentiated coefficients and represent the relative 
odds of having ever reduced labor force participation for childcare.  
[Insert Table 2.3] 
                                                 
6 Demographic and human capital characteristics include age, age squared, occupation, work hours, job 
tenure, education, and race 
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Table 1 shows that only a small percentage (6%) of the sample of couples has a 
husband who worked part time or did not work and gave childcare as the reason. This is 
consistent with research demonstrating that employees anticipate employer bias against 
workers who use flexibility policies and may believe that their requests to use flexibility 
policies will be denied outright (Brescoll, Glass, and Sedlovskaya 2013). Husbands in 
female breadwinner households were more likely to have ever reduced their labor force 
participation for childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner 
households, providing support for Hypothesis 1.  
The presence of both older children between the ages of 10 and 17 and younger 
children under age 10 increased the likelihood the husband had ever reduced his labor 
force participation. Both coefficients were positive and significant but the effect size for 
older children was larger than the effect size for younger children. This was likely an 
exposure effect; households with older children had children present for a longer 
duration, meaning there was more opportunity for the husband to reduce his labor force 
participation for childcare.  
Both wife and husband’s education had significant and positive coefficients, 
meaning that education was associated with increased likelihood that husbands reduced 
their labor force participation for childcare. Husbands were more likely to have reduced 
their labor force participation for childcare if the wife or husband was in a professional or 
managerial occupation compared to any other occupation. The coefficients for non-
professional occupations were all less than one and several were significant, including 
husbands and wives in service and clerical occupations and husbands in sales and blue-
collar/manufacturing occupations. Technical occupations were not significantly different 
from professional occupations in their likelihood of having a husband who had reduced 
his labor force participation for childcare.  
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[Insert Figures 2.1 and 2.2] 
Model 2 added an interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and 
occupation (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). For wife’s occupation, husbands in female-breadwinner 
households were more likely to have ever reduced their labor force participation than 
husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. The same was not true for 
husband’s occupation. Husbands in service and blue-collar/manufacturing were less 
likely to have reduced their labor force participation if they were in a female-breadwinner 
household. Looking at male-breadwinner and equal-earner households, both spouse’s 
occupation produced a similar pattern with professional and managerial occupations as 
the most likely and sales as the least likely to have a husband who had reduced their labor 
force participation for childcare. The patterns were different for husbands and wives in 
female-breadwinner households. For wives, working in professional and managerial 
occupations provided one of the lowest likelihood of having a husband who had reduced 
his labor force participation for childcare with only clerical occupations scoring lower. 
The pattern was reversed for female-breadwinner husbands, with professional and 
managerial occupations having one of the highest likelihoods of reducing labor force 
participation for childcare, surpassed only slightly by husbands in technical occupations.  
 
HUSBANDS’ CHILDCARE INVOLVEMENT 
In this section, I look at husbands’ involvement in childcare. Table 2.4 presents 
mixed effects regression models of husbands’ contributions to childcare regressed on 
female breadwinner status with variables for demographic and human capital 
characteristics. The models were weighted with sample weights from coarsened exact 
matching. Model 1 regressed husband’s childcare involvement on the same human capital 
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and demographic variables included in the previous model set. I also included husband’s 
reduced labor force participation for childcare as an independent variable in this model 
set because men who take leave for childcare are likely to continue providing care even 
after the end of the leave period. Model 2 added an interaction between female-
breadwinner status and husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare. Model 
3 added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and occupation to Model 1. 
Model 4 included both interactions. 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to be involved 
with children than husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples. The 
coefficient was positive and significant in all models. This provides support for 
Hypothesis 2.7 Although the coefficient was statistically significant, the effect size was 
practically very small in the first two models. The size and statistical significant both 
increased in Model 3 with the addition of an interaction between female-breadwinner 
status and each spouses’ occupation. Husbands in female-breadwinner households scored 
one third of a point higher on the childcare involvement scale than their counterparts in 
male-breadwinner and equal-earner households. 
Coefficients for the number of children age 10 to 17 and the number of children 
under were 10 were significant.8 The coefficients were negative and significant across all 
models, with older children depressing husband’s involvement slightly more than 
                                                 
7 Brines (1994) suggests that the relationship between men’s contribution to childcare and their economic 
dependency in their relationship is u-shaped. To test for non-linear relationships, I reran the models 
presented in this section and substituted a continuous measure of relative income for the binary female-
breadwinner status variable. I created relative income by dividing the wife’s income by the couple’s total 
income. The coefficient for relative income remained significant and positive, indicating a linear 
relationship between husband’s childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status.  
8 These models use the average score for husband’s involvement across all household children. I also tested 
models that used the highest score across all children. The models using the highest score of husband’s 
involvement across all children produced similar results to the models presented here. 
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younger children. This was an unexpected results; a likely explanation is that husbands 
with multiple children are actually spending more total time and are more involved 
overall, but that their average involvement score was lower because it was spread across 
multiple children. 
The models also controlled for the couple’s geographic region with the Northeast 
as the omitted category. Husbands in the West, South, and Midwest had less involvement 
with childcare than their counterparts in the Northeast. The largest and most significant 
difference was between the Northeast and West, with husbands in the West scoring 
almost 4 points lower on the childcare involvement scale.  
Husband’s childcare involvement decreased with both spouses’ age. Although this 
effect size was small, when considering an age gap of a single year, the difference 
becomes more pronounced and practically significant when comparing a woman who is 
25 to a woman who is 45. This translates into a 2.4-point difference in the husband’s 
childcare involvement scale. This was consistent with Gerson’s (2011) finding that 
younger men are more inclined toward egalitarian parenting arrangements than previous 
generations.  
Husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare increased their score on 
the childcare involvement scale. The coefficients were small but statistically significant. 
Model 2 added an interaction effect between female-breadwinner status and husband’s 
reduced labor force participation for childcare. The female-breadwinner coefficient 
remained positive and significantly and was mostly unchanged from the uninteracted 
model. The magnitude of the husband’s reduce labor force coefficient dropped, but it 
remained positive and significant. The interaction term was also positive and significant, 
indicating that husbands in female-breadwinner households had higher involvement 
scores when they worked part time or did not work. Figure 2.3 illustrates these 
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relationships with coefficients from Model 4. Husbands in female-breadwinner 
households who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare had the highest 
boost to their involvement score, followed by husbands in female-breadwinner 
households who had not reduced their labor force participation, husbands in male-
breadwinner and equal-earner households who had reduced their labor force 
participations, and husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households who had 
not reduced their labor force participation had the lowest score. 
[Insert Figures 2.4 and 2.5] 
Looking at Model 1, husbands had lower scores on the involvement scale when 
either spouse worked in a sales occupation and when husbands worked in blue-
collar/manufacturing positions, compared to their counterparts in professional and 
managerial occupations. When we look at the interaction between female-breadwinner 
status and occupation in Models 3 and 4 for both wife and husband’s occupations, 
husbands in female breadwinner households were generally more involved than their 
counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner households (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). 
Couples in blue-collar/manufacturing occupations were the exception to this trend. When 
either spouse worked in blue-collar and manufacturing occupations, husbands had higher 
levels of involvement when they lived in male-breadwinner and equal earner households. 
When wives worked in blue-collar/manufacturing occupations, husbands in male-
breadwinner and equal-earner households had very high levels of involvement, but 
husbands in female-breadwinner households had low levels of involvement. This may be 
partially explained by the prevalence of nonstandard work hours in blue-collar jobs and 
couples adopting split shift parenting arrangements (Brines 1994; Lambert 2008).9 When 
                                                 
9 Split-shift parent describes arrangements where parents work opposite shifts to maximize parental 
availability for childcare. For example, the father works 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. and then the mother works from 8 
p.m. to 4 a.m. 
 34 
the wife earns more, however, she may use her earnings to purchases substitute childcare, 
explaining the low levels of involvement from husbands in female-breadwinner 
households. 
 
Discussion 
In these models, I examined husband’s likelihood of reducing his labor force 
participation for childcare and husband’s involvement in childcare in female-breadwinner 
and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households.  
Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to have reduced 
their labor force participation for childcare by working part-time or not working. When 
thinking about a family deciding that the husband will reduce his work time to care for 
the children, there are two important considerations. First, can the couple afford for the 
husband to reduce his work time? This factor is heavily dependent on occupation. Men 
and women in lower-skill and lower-paying occupations are less likely to have access to 
paid parental leave or flexibility options like working part time temporarily because these 
benefits are treated like perks and used to reward valuable employees. Professionals and 
managers are more likely to have access to flexibility options and paid leave as part of 
their benefits package at their job (Williams, Blair-Loy and Berdahl 2013).  
In most states, the Family Medical Leave Act is the only option for workers 
without paid parental leave or the option to temporarily decrease to part time work. The 
FMLA offers unpaid parental leave for employees working in large companies who have 
been with their employer for at least a year (Milkman and Applebaum 2013). Low-wage 
workers are less likely to be able to afford to live on only one spouse’s salary and are less 
likely to extend the parental leave for either spouse past what is necessary for the 
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mother’s post-partem recovery. Analysis of California’s Paid Family Leave Program that 
provides six weeks of partially paid leave to care for newborns or family members found 
that men were more likely to take parental leave after having a child and tended to take 
longer parental leaves after the program was implemented. Affordability is a large barrier 
to taking leave, and it is significant that in this analysis couples where either spouse 
worked in a professional occupation were significantly more likely to have had the 
husband reduce his labor force participation for childcare. Professional husbands are 
more likely to have access to paid leave and professional husbands and professional 
wives are more likely to be able to afford the loss in income for the husband to work part 
time or take an unpaid or partially paid leave. 
The second factor is whether the husband is willing to reduce his labor force 
participation. Men who use flexibility policies like working part time or taking time off to 
care for children experience negative job consequences in the short and long term. Like 
women, men who reduce their hours, take a career break, or leave the labor force for 
family reasons face sharply reduced earnings (Coltrane et al. 2013). Reduced labor force 
participation results in lost human capital, putting parents who take leave after birth or 
later at a disadvantage compared to their peers with continuous work histories. Taking 
leave or using flexibility policies for childcare have gendered consequences. For 
professional men, working long hours conforms to traditional notions of masculinity 
(Blair-Loy 2003; Williams 2010). Work is viewed as compatible with (uninvolved) 
fatherhood and men who scale back work for family reasons face censure (Vandello et al. 
2013). For non-professionals, employers rely on economic control while professional 
employees internalize the ideal worker ideology (Williams, Blair-Loy, and Berdahl 
2013).  
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The financial consequences of deviating from ideal worker norms and pressure to 
conform to masculine ideal worker norms disincentivize men from reducing their work 
hours to care for children. As Gerson (2011) suggests, men may prefer an egalitarian 
division of household labor, but fall back on a neo-traditional arrangement when working 
conditions preclude an equal sharing arrangement. This analysis suggests that men who 
are able to reduce their labor force participation still choose to do so.  
Husbands in female-breadwinner households had higher levels of involvement 
with childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and equal-earner couples. 
However, the effect size was small and husbands in female-breadwinner households only 
scored one third of a point higher on the 18-point scale. Husband’s reduced labor force 
participation for childcare and its interaction with female-breadwinner households were 
also significant. When the coefficients are combined, husbands in female-breadwinner 
households who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare scored three 
quarters of a point higher on the involvement scale.  
When looking at the interaction between occupation and female-breadwinner 
status, there were a few exceptions to the trend of husband’s in female-breadwinner 
households contributing more to childcare. In male-breadwinner and equal-earner 
households, husbands had a very high involvement score when wives worked in a blue-
collar occupation. Hochschild (1997) and Lambert (2008) note that blue-collar 
occupations often require regularly scheduled non-standard worker hours in the form of 
evening and overnight shifts. This is conducive to and may even necessitate split-shift 
parenting, especially in low-income households. 
Husbands in male-breadwinner and equal earner households had higher levels of 
involvement than those in female-breadwinner households when either spouse works in a 
blue-collar/manufacturing position. Husbands in male-breadwinner and equal-earner 
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households were also more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for 
childcare if he worked in a service or blue-collar/manufacturing job, compared to their 
counterparts in female-breadwinner households. Brines (1994) argues that breadwinning 
is associated with masculinity for many men and that men react to financial dependence 
in different ways. Some men shift their conception of masculinity away from supporting 
the family financially and toward being an involved father and equal contributor to 
reproductive labor in the home. Other men, especially those with more traditional gender 
attitudes, react to a perceived blow to their masculinity by distancing themselves from 
tasks like housework and childcare. Brines’ argument of family context shaping men’s 
reactions to financial dependence helps to explain the overall positive female-
breadwinner effect on husband’s involvement and reduced labor force participation for 
most occupations and the exception we saw in blue-collar/manufacturing and service 
occupations. The 2008 SIPP did not ask about gender ideology, but a future topic for 
investigation would incorporate a measure of gender ideology into the analysis of 
reproductive labor in female-breadwinner households. 
This analysis has several limitations that are important to note. First, the 2008 
SIPP does not contain measures of the mother’s involvement with childcare. Although 
we do know that some husbands are contributing more than other husbands, I am not able 
to compare husband and wives’ involvement in or determine if husband’s contributions 
reduce the amount of childcare contributed by wives. Second, while I include two 
measures of husband’s contributions to childcare, this does not capture all of the 
childcare and housework that they are performing and presents a potential threat to the 
face validity of the scale. A better scale would have also considered how much time 
husbands contributed toward childcare (ideally as a percentage of total parental childcare 
time) or husbands’ involvement in more essential care tasks like meal preparation, 
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transportation, and emergency or weekday care for children. The current scale remains a 
useful measure, however, because it considers the types of childcare tasks that men are 
most likely to perform.  
This analysis suggests that men are more likely to take time off to care for 
children and to be more involved in childcare when they live in female-breadwinner 
households. Men are also more likely to reduce their labor force participation when they 
work in professional/managerial or technical occupations that are more likely to offer 
flexibility benefits. The culture of overwork and absolute worker flexibility fails to 
realize that a minimum level of care is necessary to maintain workers and to raise 
children. These structural constraints at work contribute to the stalled revolution in the 
home. Husbands who reduced their labor force participation for childcare continued to be 
involved in childcare at a higher rate than those who did not. This analysis and others 
suggest that men want to contribute more equally to childcare and that they are more 
likely to choose to do so when structural constraints are eased. However, we are unlikely 
to see wide scale adoption of egalitarian parenting practices until the ideal worker norm is 
modernized to account for a dual-income or single-parent household and recognize (and 
compensate parents for) the diffuse benefits of raising children to employers and society.  
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife’s Income 
Wife's Income by Decile 
Male-Breadwinner 
and Equal-Earner 
Households 
Female-Breadwinner 
Households 
Total 
(Lower Income)              1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
        
2 0.10 0.09 0.10 
        
3 0.10 0.11 0.11 
        
4 0.10 0.07 0.10 
        
5 0.10 0.11 0.10 
        
6 0.10 0.09 0.10 
        
7 0.11 0.11 0.11 
        
8 0.10 0.08 0.10 
        
9 0.10 0.12 0.10 
        
(Higher Income)            10 0.08 0.10 0.08 
        
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 4567 1013 5580 
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Table 2.2: Means and Distributions by Female-Breadwinner Status 
  
Total 
MBW & 
Equal Earner 
Female 
Breadwinner 
  
Income 
    Wife's Monthly Earnings $2,931 $2,683 $4,052 *** 
Husband's Monthly Earnings $4,480 $5,369 $2,947 *** 
Dependent Variable 
    Husband's Involvement Scale 9.1 9.1 9.1 
 Husband's Reduced LFP .06 .05 .08 * 
Controls 
    Number of Kids 10-17 .7 .7 L7 
 Number of Kids <10 1.2 1.2 1.1 
 Region 
    Northeast .19 .19 .20 
 Midwest .23 .23 .20 
 West .25 .25 .26 
 South .33 .33 .33 
 Wife's Characteristics 
    Wife's Age 38.3 38.2 38.7 
 Wife's Occupation 
   
* 
Professional .36 .36 .34 
 Technical .11 .10 .12 
 Service .17 .17 .20 
 Sales .08 .07 .09 
 Clerical .21 .23 .16 
 Blue Collar .07 .07 .09 
 Wife's Job Tenure 6.1 6.1 6.4 
 Wife's Work Hours 36.9 36.5 36.4 
 Wife's Education 
    Less than High School .06 .06 .08 
 High School Graduate .19 .19 .20 
 Some College .36 .37 .34 
 College Graduate .38 .39 .38 
 Wife's Race 
    White .72 .72 .71 
 Black .07 .07 .06 
 Asian or Other .09 .09 .10 
 Hispanic/Latino .12 .12 .13 
 Husband's Characteristics 
    Husband's Age 40.7 40.5 41.8 
 Husband's Occupation 
   
*** 
Professional .46 .41 .70 
 Technical .02 .03 .01 
 Service .09 .09 .06 
 Sales .07 .07 .03 
 Clerical .05 .06 .04 
 Blue Collar .31 .34 .16 
 Husband's Job Tenure 6.2 6.1 6.4 
 Husband's Work Hours 38.7 39.8 42.1 * 
Husband's Education 
   
** 
Less than High School .10 .10 .11 
 High School Graduate .27 .26 .28 
 Some College .34 .34 .33 
 College Graduate .29 .30 .28 
 Husband's Race 
    White .70 .70 .69 
 Black .07 .07 .08 
 Asian or Other .09 .09 .10 
 Hispanic/Latino .14 .14 .13  
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Table 2.3: Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation Mixed Effects Logit 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Female Breadwinner 1.41 *** 1.25 *** 
Number of Kids 10-18 1.91 *** 1.99 *** 
Number of Kids <10 1.47 *** 1.51 *** 
Region     
 
  
(Northeast)     
 
  
Midwest 0.89   0.91   
West 1.63   1.68   
South 0.68   0.66   
Wife's Age 0.85   0.81   
Wife's Occupation     
 
  
(Professional/Managerial)     
 
  
Technical 0.88   0.32 ** 
Service 0.30 *** 0.12 *** 
Sales 0.68   0.03 ** 
Clerical 0.46 ** 0.38 * 
Blue Collar/Manuf. 0.62   0.30 * 
Wife's Job Tenure 0.96 * 0.96 ** 
Wife's Education 1.35 *** 1.36 *** 
Husband's Age 0.91   0.90   
Husband's occupation     
 
  
(Professional/Managerial)     
 
  
Technical 0.63   0.51   
Service 0.11 *** 0.27 ** 
Sales 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
Clerical 0.13 *** 0.11 *** 
Blue Collar/Manuf. 0.10 *** 0.19 *** 
Husband's Education 0.73 *** 0.73 *** 
FBW*Wife's Occupation     
 
  
(Professional)     
 
  
Technical     2.15 *** 
Service     3.20 *** 
Sale     3.38 *** 
Clerical     1.55   
Blue Collar/Manuf.     1.99 * 
FBW*Husband's Occupation     
 
  
(Professional)     
 
  
Technical     1.52   
Service     0.33 * 
Sale     
 
  
Clerical     1.09   
Blue Collar/Manuf.     0.42 * 
Constant 13.02   9.40   
N 68,444 68,444 
Note: Models control for wife's and husband's age, age squared, education, work 
hours, and job tenure. 
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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Table 2.4: Husband’s Childcare Involvement Mixed Effects Regression 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female Breadwinner 0.07 * 0.08 * 0.34 *** 0.36 *** 
Husband's Reduced LFP 0.23 * 0.19 ** 0.27 ** 0.23 ** 
Number of Kids 10-18 -0.43 *** -0.43 *** -0.43 *** -0.43 *** 
Number of Kids <10 -0.34 *** -0.34 *** -0.34 *** -0.34 *** 
Region                 
(Northeast)                 
Midwest -0.51 * -0.52 * -0.51 * -0.52 * 
West -3.92 *** -3.92 *** -3.95 *** -3.96 *** 
South -0.47 * -0.47 * -0.46 * -0.46 * 
Wife's Age -0.12 ** -0.12 ** -0.12 ** -0.12 ** 
Wife's Occupation                 
(Professional/Managerial)                 
Technical 0.21 * 0.21 * 0.32 *** 0.32 *** 
Service 0.25 *** 0.26 *** 0.14 * 0.14 * 
Sales -0.18 * -0.18 * -0.20 * -0.20 * 
Clerical 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 
Blue Collar/Manuf. 1.27 *** 1.27 *** 1.55 *** 1.55 *** 
Wife's Job Tenure -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 
Wife's Education 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 
Husband's Age -0.16 *** -0.16 *** -0.16 *** -0.16 *** 
Husband's occupation                 
(Professional/Managerial)                 
Technical 0.66 *** 0.67 *** 0.41 * 0.42 * 
Service 0.05   0.05   0.06   0.05   
Sales -0.27 *** -0.28 *** -0.23 ** -0.23 ** 
Clerical 0.13   0.13   0.20 * 0.20 * 
Blue Collar/Manuf. -0.29 *** -0.29 *** -0.11 * -0.11 * 
Husband's Education -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** 
FBW*Husband's Reduced LFP     0.14 ***     0.16 *** 
FBW*Wife's Occupation                 
(Professional)                 
Technical         -0.74 *** -0.74 *** 
Service         0.47 *** 0.47 *** 
Sale         0.03   0.03   
Clerical         -0.29 *** -0.30 *** 
Blue Collar/Manuf.         -1.40 *** -1.41 *** 
FBW*Husband's Occupation                 
(Professional)                 
Technical         1.21 *** 1.20 *** 
Service         0.23 * 0.22 * 
Sale         0.31 * 0.30   
Clerical         -0.04   -0.05   
Blue Collar/Manuf.         -0.61 *** -0.62 *** 
Constant 20.22 *** 20.61 *** 19.43 *** 19.82 *** 
N 106,682 106,682 106,682 106,682 
Note: Models control for wife's and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure. 
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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Figure 2.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife’s Occupation, and Husband’s Reduced 
Labor Force Participation: The omitted category is male-breadwinner and 
equal-earner households where husbands and wives work in professional 
occupations. 
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Figure 2.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Occupation, and Husband’s Reduced 
Labor Force Participation: The omitted category is male-breadwinner and 
equal-earner households where husbands and wives work in professional 
occupations. 
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Figure 2.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation, 
and Husband’s Childcare Involvement: The omitted category is male-
breadwinner and equal-earner households where the husband has not 
reduced labor force participation for childcare. 
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Figure 2.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Wife’s Occupation, and Husband’s Childcare 
Involvement 
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Figure 2.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Occupation, and Husband’s Childcare 
Involvement 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND 
MOTHER’S EARNINGS 
 
Introduction 
Researchers sometimes call workplaces “greedy” institutions because they often 
demand complete commitment from employees. Compared to men, women in households 
with young children devote more time to work, both paid work in the labor force and 
unpaid reproductive labor at home (Deutsch 1999). In discourse and practice, women are 
responsible for most of the reproductive labor within households (Hochschild 1989; 
Williams 2000; Stone 2007). Women’s earnings decrease when they have children while 
men’s earnings tend to increase when they have children because men benefit from 
women’s unpaid labor at home (Budig and England 2001; Folbre 2001; Gornick and 
Meyers 2003; Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2010). These effects are called the 
motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium.  
Yet, in some households, mothers are the primary breadwinners. The 2010 Census 
shows that the proportion of female-breadwinner households is increasing as the United 
States moves out of the economic recession (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). Mothers 
are the only or primary breadwinner in 40% of households with children under age 18, of 
which 15% are in married couples and 25% are single or cohabitating mothers. My 
research looks at reproductive labor in female-breadwinner families—heterosexual 
households where the woman provides a majority or all of the household earnings. 
Female-breadwinner households are theoretically important for understanding the 
fatherhood premium and motherhood penalty experienced by mothers and fathers in all 
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types of household formations because it provides a case that breaks the traditionally 
defined gender responsibilities within the home. This analysis investigates if the 
motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium are specifically gendered, or whether 
female-breadwinner households are a test case for finding mothers who experience a 
breadwinner premium. 
Several qualitative interview studies examine how housework and other aspects of 
reproductive labor are negotiated in female-breadwinner households and theorize how 
this may impact women’s status at work (see Coltrane 1989, Legerski and Cornwall 
2010; Chesley 2011).  I build on these interview studies by investigating how shifts in 
contributions to reproductive labor affect women’s relationship to market labor and how 
men’s contributions to reproductive labor impact women’s career outcomes.  
I use the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and 
longitudinal mixed effects methods to model the relationship between husbands’ and 
wives’ change in earnings over time and husband’s contributions to childcare with a 
focus on female-breadwinner households. This dataset tracks participants during the 
Great Recession, which may have yielded a larger sample of female-breadwinner 
households than we would expect in a non-recession period. I focus on two research 
questions: 
 
1. How do the careers of mothers who receive significant support from a partner for 
unpaid reproductive labor differ from the careers of mothers who do not receive 
significant support?  
2. How do the careers of fathers who participate in household reproductive labor 
differ from the careers of fathers who do not participate significantly in household 
reproductive labor? 
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Background 
Organizations are gendered, and much of organizational structure is developed 
around an abstract and disembodied ideal worker who exists only to fill the job (Acker 
1990). Organizations constructed this unattainable ideal in the post-war period from men 
in traditional nuclear families who had wives to take care of their children and day-to-day 
needs. Collins and Mayer (2010) update Acker’s ideal worker with the concept of the 
solitary wage bargain, which shifts the focus from workplace cultures that support male-
biased norms to economic and institutional arrangements that benefit business and harm 
workers and their families. They argue that workplaces and government have abdicated 
responsibility for social reproduction, forcing men and women to balance jobs without 
benefits or schedule flexibility with the day-to-day reproductive labor required to raise 
the next generation of workers. Using this perspective, men and women who decide to 
focus on market work and not to participate in reproductive labor make an economic 
decision in response to the material realities of the market—without some form of outside 
assistance in the form of social programs subsidizing childcare or extended family 
members to provide childcare, their market work will suffer if they act as the primary 
parent for their children. 
Mothers earn less than all other workers, both men with or without children and 
childless women, because mothers have more interruptions in job experience than non-
mothers (Budig and England 2001). Coltrane et al. (2013) have replicated Budig and 
England’s (2001) findings using a sample of men, demonstrating that men also face 
decreased earnings potential when they experience career interruptions related to 
childcare. For both men and women these interruptions most often take the form of 
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parental leave for the birth or adoption of a child. Women’s primary responsibility for 
reproductive labor pushes women out of high-pressure, white-collar careers at a greater 
rate than men (Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Cha 2013). Williams (2000) calls this the 
“maternal wall” that prevents mothers with reproductive labor responsibilities from 
conforming to a 40-, 50-, or 60-plus hour per week schedule because they lack support at 
home. Moreover, women with husbands who work 60 or more hours each week, a 
phenomenon Cha (2010) calls “overwork,” are more likely to leave the paid labor force 
that women with husbands who work fewer hours. This positive relationship between 
husband’s overwork and wives’ likelihood of quitting is strongest for wives who work in 
professional or managerial occupations that are themselves characterized by a culture of 
overwork and hostility to deviations from the male ideal worker norm. This positive 
relationship is even stronger for mothers than for childless women.  
Along with longer hours for professionals and managers, workplaces are 
increasingly requiring hourly employees to be “on call” so managers can adjust to daily 
and even hourly fluctuations in demand for work hours (Lambert 2008). The employer 
preference for flexible employees who can match their schedules to the shifting needs of 
the workplace further marginalizes mothers, especially in working-class jobs that demand 
the most schedule flexibility of incumbents (Goldin 2001). Norms of overwork and 
worker flexibility systematically disadvantage women because this culture assumes, 
encourages, and even requires specialization within households so that workers can avoid 
family care responsibilities. 
Men and women do not freely choose to leave the labor force to fulfill family 
obligations. Middle-class women who attempt to balance their work and life 
commitments by reducing their work hours or using other flexibility policies often find 
themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the “mommy track,” or pushed 
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out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Stone and 
Ackerly 2013). Working-class women face similar stigma and their job opportunities and 
options for employment are limited because of their perceived or actual care 
responsibilities. The problem of “balancing” work and family does not just affect women; 
however, men also experience strain and risk damaging their career prospects and 
earnings potential when they contribute to childcare (Coltrane 2013). Men and women 
both report wanting to spend less time working for pay and more time with their families 
(Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Like women, men face constrained choices and report 
reluctance to take advantage of flexibility options at work or to take time off for family or 
childcare because they fear negative employer evaluations and/or stalled careers. 
Williams’ (2010) analysis of workplace arbitration reports of union employees who were 
fired or disciplined after family care emergencies found that half of these cases came 
from men. Overall, men were more reluctant than women to divulge that their absence 
from work was due to family or childcare reasons. This highlights the reality that in a 
workforce increasingly comprised of dual-income families, both men and women are 
struggling to find solutions to their childcare needs that do not compromise their careers. 
Several theoretical perspectives explain women’s disproportionate responsibility 
for reproductive labor and the gender pay gap. I start by discussing human capital 
explanations and them move to review explanations that focus on “doing gender” and 
discrimination. 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL EXPLANATIONS 
When applied to the gender wage gap, the human capital perspective argues that 
men and women possess different types and levels of human capital and, therefore, 
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employers compensate them at different rates (Kilbourne et al. 1994; Tam 1997; 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002). Men are more likely to develop specialized 
human capital, which has less transfer value and employers therefore compensate it at a 
higher rate than non-specialized human capital (Tam 1997). In this scenario, qualities of 
individuals and not of organizational practices or managerial biases create the gender 
wage gap—compared to men, women tend to acquire less or less valuable human capital 
so employers compensate women at a lower rate than men because women are less 
valuable employees.  
Rational choice theories argue that families make decisions about who will 
perform reproductive labor according to which spouse has the most time and/or least 
earning potential (Becker 1981). According to this perspective, men often have an 
advantage in market work because they tend to have higher levels of human capital and 
they are minimally involved in the biological processes of reproduction. Families 
generally experience a greater loss of income when men reduce their paid work 
commitment or take leaves (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Therefore, this perspective 
argues that heterosexual couples make a rational decision to maximize the financial 
stability of their families by relying on and investing most heavily in the career of the 
partner with the most earnings potential at the expense of the career of the partner with 
the least earnings potential. This will most often result in a man who specializes in 
breadwinning and a woman who may work for pay full or part time but whose primary 
responsibility is reproductive labor. 
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DOING GENDER EXPLANATIONS 
Other perspectives argue that human capital and rational economic decision 
making do not fully explain women’s responsibility for reproductive labor and the gender 
pay gap. The “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) and feminist psychoanalytic 
(Chodorow 1978) perspectives argue that heterosexual relationships provide an 
opportunity for performing gender that allows men and women to highlight gender 
difference in a way that is pleasurable and builds and affirms identity (Ridgeway and 
Correll 2004). Reproductive labor is one area that allows men and women to do gender 
by either participating in or distancing themselves from the traditionally feminine coded 
activities of housework and childcare (Coltrane 1989; Walzer 1998). Walzer (1989) 
argues that when couples talk about financial need to specialize, they are more likely to 
talk about the mother’s employment and earnings as optional than to use a similar 
framing for the father’s work. Deutsch (1999) characterizes parents’ division of labor not 
as a fixed arrangement, but as an ongoing and evolving negotiation between both 
partners. A couple may view or talk about their division of labor as static and stemming 
from deeply held personal beliefs, but Deutsch argues that both partners affirm and/or 
resist their involvement in day to day childcare tasks and that these positive or negative 
reactions reshape the division of labor over time.  
In addition to doing gender at home, women’s activities outside of the home are 
informed and limited by the same innate qualities that make women “well suited” for 
motherhood and reproductive labor. Williams (2010) expands the idea of doing gender at 
home to the workplace, highlighting the workaholic culture of white-collared managers 
that persists irrationally despite rarely yielding increased productivity or profits. Rather, 
the long hours and dedication that alienate these men from their families are an attempt to 
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prove masculinity in a purportedly gender-neutral environment while distancing 
themselves from the feminine realm of the home. 
 
DISCRIMINATION EXPLANATIONS 
Employers and managers use gendered beliefs about gender appropriate parenting 
and work commitment to make hiring and advancement decisions in the workplace. 
Research attributes part of the motherhood penalty to discrimination. Correll, Benard, and 
Paik (2007) argue that motherhood is a status characteristic—a quality that produces 
biased evaluations of an individual’s performance when relevant, including lower salary 
recommendations, harsher standards for work commitment, and higher standards for 
perceived competency. Because organizations assume women hold primary responsibility 
for reproductive labor, women are marginalized in the workplace and valued less by 
organizations than their “more committed” male peers. Women’s perceived “strained 
commitment” is exacerbated once they have children because employers assume mothers 
will respond to the increased demands of parenthood by shifting their priorities away 
from the workplace and toward the needs of their children (Blair-Loy 2003). The 
opposite is true for men who employers assume become more attached to paid work after 
having children. 
According to these perspectives, gender matters beyond acquisition of more or 
less valuable types of human capital. Men and women build and affirm their identities by 
carrying out certain types of activities within and outside of the home, and employers 
make assumptions about relative commitment and abilities that fall along gender lines 
because reproductive labor and breadwinning are gendered activities and identities.  
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THE CURRENT ANALYSIS 
This research contributes to the literatures on women’s and men’s reproductive 
and paid labor by looking at the careers of husbands and wives in households where the 
traditional homemaker and breadwinner division of labor is flipped as a new angle for 
exploring the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. Work and family researchers 
have extensively documented the strain families experience when balancing the demands 
of work and family and how women’s greater responsibility for reproductive labor 
suppresses their careers (see Williams 2000 and 2010 for a review). Women who have 
strong support at home for reproductive labor are likely to make fewer career sacrifices or 
compromises than women who are primarily responsible for reproductive labor within 
their households. I expect that wives with support for reproductive labor at home will 
have better career outcomes, such as higher salaries, and experience less of a caregiver 
penalty than wives without support. I also expect that men who contribute significantly to 
household reproductive labor will incur a caregiver penalty analogous to the motherhood 
penalty that research has documented for women. In this analysis, I expect that: 
 
H3. Wives with husbands who have reduced their labor force participation for 
childcare at any point will experience a larger increase in earnings than wives 
with husbands who have never reduced their labor force participation for 
childcare. 
H4. Husbands who have reduced their labor force participation for childcare at any 
point will experience a smaller increase in earnings than men who have not 
reduced their labor force participation for childcare.  
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In this scenario, the husband is shifting attention from market work to 
reproductive labor in the home. We can expect that the wife will need to focus her 
attention on market work and that her career will be supported by her husband. Milkman 
and Applebaum (2013) argue that men who take leave soon after their child(ren) are born 
retain greater attachment to their child(ren) later in life. Early leaves taken by fathers and 
early father involvement in childcare, even if it is only temporary, have the potential to 
impact the couple’s division of reproductive labor throughout the dependency of the child 
and for the duration of the relationship. For this reason, I look at whether the husband has 
ever reduced his labor force participation for childcare instead of whether he is currently 
reducing his labor force participation. Husbands’ reduced labor force participation can 
decrease mothers’ caregiver penalty beyond the period of time where the father is the 
primary caretaker of the children. It also has the potential to result in a caregiver penalty 
for the man that persists past the time of his reduced labor force participation as we see in 
the stalled careers of mothers. 
The literature on reproductive labor and the gender pay gap has extensively 
documented the relationship between responsibility for childcare and negative career 
outcomes. When looking at men’s involvement in childcare, I expect that: 
 
H5. Wives with husbands who are more involved with childcare will experience a 
larger increase in earnings than wives with husbands who contribute lower 
amounts of childcare.  
H6. Husbands who are more involved with childcare will experience a smaller 
increase in earnings than husbands who contribute lower amounts of childcare.  
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The final pair of hypotheses addresses the gendered nature of the motherhood 
premium and fatherhood penalty. The doing gender and feminist psychoanalytic 
perspectives argue that carework and breadwinning have gendered meanings that help 
men and women create and maintain gender identities. The ideal of intensive mothering 
(Hays 1998) is pervasive, and, although fathers face rising expectations for their 
contributions to parenting, women face harsher standards to be considered “good 
mothers” and are more frequently and publicly castigated for perceived shortcomings in 
childrearing. These high standards for mothers make it likely that wives in female-
breadwinner households will not stop contributing to housework and childcare within 
their families. This means that wives in these households presumably spend less time 
doing reproductive labor than women who do not have a partner who focuses on 
childcare, but we would not expect breadwinning mothers to focus their work efforts 
completely on the paid labor force as has been documented with high-achieving, 
overworked men (Cha 2010). This leads to the following two hypotheses regarding 
women and men’s change in earnings: 
 
H7. Wives in female-breadwinner households will not receive a breadwinner premium 
comparable to the premium experienced by fathers. 
H8. Men in female-breadwinner households will continue to receive a breadwinner 
premium, but it will be smaller than the premium that men in equal-earner and 
male-breadwinner households receive. 
 
Employer biases against mothers and in favor of fathers support both the 
caregiver penalty and the breadwinner premium (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). I 
expect that a male partner’s contributions to reproductive labor will not completely 
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eliminate the penalty experienced by mothers and that it will not result in a premium 
similar to that experienced by fathers because of status and discrimination and because 
wives with significant partner support for reproductive labor are likely to continue 
contributing significantly to housework and childrearing. Wives’ status as mothers will 
still result in biased evaluations at work, decreased perceptions of workplace 
commitment, and increased perception of work-family strain, all of which contribute to 
the caregiver penalty. 
For similar reasons, I expect that men in female-breadwinner households and who 
contribute to reproductive labor at home will experience the benefits of employer’s 
positive characterization of fatherhood and continue to receive a breadwinner premium. 
Their breadwinner premium may, however, be reduced because men’s contributions to 
reproductive labor at home preclude complete commitment to the workplace and 
marginalize men who cannot enact the ideal worker norm that is most valued by 
employers. 
Occupation complicates the relationship between female-breadwinner status and 
earnings growth. Some occupations are more strongly characterized by family friendly or 
family unfriendly cultures than others. For example, Lambert (2008) notes that employers 
benefit from the rapid turnover resulting from their family-unfriendly scheduling. 
Coltrane et al. (2013) found that men suffered reduced earnings when they used 
flexibility policies at work, but that men in higher status occupations experienced a 
smaller penalty. Cha (2010) found that women who worked in professional or managerial 
occupations characterized by expectations of total commitment experienced more 
negative effects from spousal overwork than similar women in other occupations. For this 
reason, I look at the interaction between female-breadwinner status and each partner’s 
occupation.  
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When considering the differences between female-breadwinner and equal-
earner/male-breadwinner couples, it is important to consider the threat of endogeneity to 
the validity of the models. Husbands could decide to work part time or to drop out of the 
labor force, not because they are especially committed to childcare, but because their 
wives have much better career prospects and earnings potential. I use coarsened exact 
matching to ensure that I am comparing female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-
breadwinner couples with similar observable characteristics. However, differences 
between the two categories of couples in earnings growth, husband’s decision to reduce 
labor force participation for childcare, and other variables could stem from unmeasured 
factors. I have made efforts to control for a number of individual- and couple-level 
demographic and human capital variables and to create sampling weights based on these 
variables to minimize the threat of unobservable characteristics.  
 
Methods 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
For this analysis I used the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(2008 SIPP), a nationally representative household-level survey that was conducted from 
2008 to 2013. The survey consists of 16 waves with four months between each wave. The 
2008 SIPP Core Survey was administered to all individuals residing within a household 
and contains detailed information about family composition, individual earnings for all 
employed household residents, and a job history for each individual. The survey collected 
information for each of the four months during a wave, yielding a maximum of 64 
observations of earnings for each participant.  
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For these analyses, I restricted the sample to heterosexual married couples with at 
least one child in residence, where both partners were in the sample and lived in the same 
household. Although the 2008 SIPP allows me to match unmarried couples, I only 
included married couples because marriage indicates expectations of long term planning 
and support within the couple that would allow and encourage both partners to make 
work and childcare decisions based on the other partner’s past, present, and expected 
future contributions to the household. I further limited the sample to heterosexual couples 
because, although the SIPP is a large dataset, it did not include a sufficient number of 
same-sex couples, married or cohabitating, for analysis. I excluded couples where one 
partner was not in the sample because the 2008 SIPP did not ask questions about reasons 
for not working or offer a detailed income breakdown for the absent partner. I also 
restricted the sample to married couples who are living together because the primary aim 
of this analysis is to analyze the impact of the division of reproductive labor. Although 
non-cohabiting married couples with children must also negotiate and split childcare, this 
process and its outcomes likely looks very different from the division of labor between 
cohabitating spouses. Finally, I restricted the sample to couples where both spouses were 
employed for at least half of the months they were included in the survey to get reliable 
earnings data for both partners. 
 
VARIABLES AND CONTROLS 
This analysis contains two model sets. The first model set only included the wives 
from the sample and models the wife’s change in earnings. Similarly, the second model 
set only included the husbands from the sample and models the husband’s change in 
earnings. In the models, race is the only time invariant variable and uses random effects 
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while the remaining variables vary over time and use fixed effects that consider the 
within sample variation. My primary dependent variable for both model sets is total 
individual earnings. This is a continuous variable measuring earnings from work in the 
paid labor force during each month. In both models, I used the natural log of earnings to 
account for positive skew in distribution of earnings.  
I included three primary independent variables of interest in the two model sets. 
First, female-breadwinner status was calculated for each married couple. It is a dummy 
variable indicating if the wife earns 70% or more of the couple’s combined individual 
earnings. I chose 70% as the cut point to ensure a large disparity in relative earnings to 
maximize the likelihood that the couple was both aware of the gap in earnings and 
considered it when making decisions about jobs and the division of household labor. I 
also considered cut points of 60% and 80% when constructing the models. Models using 
the 60% cut point produced results similar to those presented here, but the 80% cut point 
yielded too few female-breadwinner households for analysis. Using the 70% cut point, 
18% of the couples in the sample had a female breadwinner in the first wave. Nearly half 
of the couples were female-breadwinner at some point during the time they were 
surveyed, and slightly more than half of the sample changed their female-breadwinner 
status at least once during the course of the survey. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of 
female-breadwinner households by earnings. Female-breadwinner households were fairly 
evenly distributed by wife’s earnings.10 Couples who changed breadwinner-status were 
fairly evenly distributed across earnings categories. This suggests that female-
breadwinner status is not correlated with wife’s earnings or couple’s earnings for this 
sample and that breadwinner status is not stable within households. Female-breadwinner 
                                                 
10 I also investigated distribution of female-breadwinner households by total family income and by 
husband’s income. Female-breadwinner households were similarly evenly distributed in both cases. 
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households represent a status that may or may not change over time and not a static 
household formation.  
[Insert Table 3.1] 
The second independent variable is husband’s childcare involvement.11 This is a 
scale created from three variables: 1) a count of the number of times the husband ate 
dinner with the child(ren) in a week; 2) a count of the number of times the husband ate 
breakfast with the child(ren) in a week; and 3) a count of the number of times the 
husband played with or talked to the child(ren) in the past week for more than five 
minutes. The alpha for this scale was .86. I grouped the scale values into three categories 
indicating low, medium, and high levels of childcare involvement. Participants answered 
these questions for each of the couple’s children. To standardize the measure across 
families with different numbers of children, I considered both the maximum and the 
average score on the scale. Both methods produced similar results. For the model sets 
presented in this analysis, I used the average score for husband’s childcare involvement 
across all of the couple’s household children. I divided the scale into three categories of 
low, medium and high involvement.12 
Although the husband’s childcare involvement scale did not measure total hours 
contributed to childcare or include measures of housework, it is a useful measure of the 
husband’s involvement because it captures the type of childcare that men are most likely 
to provide. When considering all types of reproductive labor, men are more likely to 
contribute to childcare than to housework (Connelly and Kimmell 2010) and are more 
likely to spend time playing with children or taking them on weekend outings rather than 
                                                 
11 The 2008 SIPP only includes measures of the husband’s interaction with the children and does not have 
comparable measures of whether and how frequently wives interact with their children.  
12 I also tested models that used a continuous measure of husband’s childcare involvement and models that 
logged husband’s childcare involvement. Models using the logged variable did not have significant effects 
for involvement. The categorical version of involvement provided the best fit for the models. 
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contributing to the more routine, day-to-day care activities like bathing young children, 
helping with homework, and preparing meals (Williams 2000; Stone 2007). Men are also 
less likely to spend time on the invisible management and emotional labor of childcare; 
tasks like keeping track of how well children’s clothes fit, scheduling medical 
appointments, and monitoring progress in school.  
The final independent variable is husband’s reduced labor force participation. 
Because one of the main purposes of the SIPP is to evaluate public program use and 
effectiveness, it collected detailed information about people’s reasons for not working 
full time. The survey included two questions that asked participants why they were 
working part time or were not working for pay. One option was “taking care of children.” 
Husband’s reduced labor force participation is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
husband has reduced his participation in the paid labor force to care for children, by 
either not working or working part time, since having children. I chose to consider 
whether the husband has ever reduced his labor force participation instead of whether he 
was currently working part time or nor working for reasons related to childcare because 
these temporary arrangements can have a long lasting impact on the household division 
of childcare (Milkman and Applebaum 2013). Furthermore, taking time off from work or 
using flexibility policies for childcare is less common for men than women, so this could 
serve as an indicator of a less traditional and more egalitarian gender ideology. 
The models included controls for several couple- and individual-level 
characteristics (Table 3.2). Number of children is a count of the number of the couple’s 
children under age 18 that lived in the household during the survey period. All couples in 
the sample had at least one child, and I coded the variable to create a cap of eight 
children. Both female-breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had an 
average of 1.8 children living in the household. Number of young children is a count of 
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the number of the couple’s children under age 10 that lived in the household during the 
survey period. The minimum value was zero, and I capped the maximum at eight. Again, 
female breadwinner and equal-earner/male-breadwinner couples had similar averages for 
the number of young children in the household with 1.1 and 1.2 children, respectively. 
Region is a categorical indicator for geographic location. Most of the couples lived in the 
South (33%), followed by the West (25%), Midwest (23%), and Northeast (19%). This 
distribution was similar for both categories of couples. 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
 Age is continuous for both wives and husbands. The average age in female 
breadwinner couples was 38.7 for wives and 41.8 for husbands. This was similar to the 
averages for equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples where the average age was 38.2 
for wives and 40.5 for husbands. Occupation in the 2008 SIPP used 2002 Census 
Occupation Codes. I divided occupations into six categories: professional/managerial, 
technical, service, sales, clerical, and blue collar/manufacturing. The distribution for 
wives’ occupations was mostly similar across the two categories of households, with the 
exception of clerical occupations; wives in female-breadwinner households were less 
likely to work in clerical occupations than wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
households. There was less similarity in the distribution of husbands’ occupations. 
Husbands in female-breadwinner households were more likely to work in a professional 
occupation and less likely to work in a blue collar/manufacturing occupations than 
husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households.  
Job tenure is a continuous measurement of the number of years the person has 
spent working in the same job. I created it by subtracting the starting date of the job from 
the interview month and year. The average length of tenure was a bit over six years for 
both husbands and wives. Wives and husbands in female-breadwinner couples had 
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slightly longer tenures than their counterparts in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
couples with a difference of a just less than five months. Work hours is a continuous 
measure of the average number of hours worked each week in the last month. Wives from 
both groups of households had similar averages for work hours at around 37 hours per 
week. Husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households had slightly longer 
work hours at 42 hours per week compared to 40 hours for husbands in female-
breadwinner households. Education was measured using 16 categories in the 2008 SIPP. 
I reduced the number of categories to four: less than high school, high school graduate, 
some college, and college graduate. Both categories of couples had similar education 
levels. For wives, 38% had a college degree, 36% had some college, 19% had graduated 
high school, and 6% had not completed high school. For husbands, 29% had a college 
degree, 34% had some college, 27% had graduated high school, and 10% had not 
completed high school. Race is divided into four categories: white, Black, Asian or 
Other, and Hispanic/Latino. The distribution for both wives’ and husbands’ race was 
similar across female-breadwinner and equal-earner and male-breadwinner couples. For 
wives, 72% were white, 7% were Black, 12% were Hispanic or Latino, and 9% were 
Asian or other. For Husbands, 70% were white, 7% were Black, 14% were Hispanic or 
Latino, and 9% were Asian or other. 
 
MATCHING 
I addressed the potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to 
change in earnings by using coarsened exact matching to allow me to compare wives in 
female-breadwinner households to wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
households who are similar in salient characteristics. Matching techniques “prune 
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observations from the data so that the remaining data have better balance between the 
treated and the control groups, meaning that the empirical distribution of the covariates 
(X) in the groups are more similar” (Blackwell et al. 2009). Coarsened exact matching 
differs from other types of matching like propensity score matching because it only 
requires that the data is temporarily put into similar segments and matched between the 
control and treated group. This process produces a sampling weight that can be applied to 
the original, uncoarsened data. This is especially useful for continuous measures like job 
tenure and age because CEM will temporarily group these measures into segments to 
produce sampling weights, transforming them from continuous to categorical, but the 
sampling weights can then be applied to the original continuous variable in regression 
models. I matched on the wife’s characteristics because my research questions depend on 
the husband’s special characteristics differing from his counterparts’ in the equal-earner 
and male-breadwinner couples, in this case, his increased involvement to childcare and 
decreased commitment to paid work.13  
For coarsened exact matching in this analysis, I used equal-earner and male-
breadwinner couples as a control group and female-breadwinner couples as the treatment 
group. I matched on education, race, number of children, geographic region, wife’s 
occupation, wife’s work hours, and wife’s job tenure. I specified cut points for education 
(divided into four groups: less than high school, high school, some college, and college 
graduate) and number of children (divided into three groups: one, two, and three or more 
children) based on the distribution of these variables within the data and because these 
are theoretically meaningful categories for these variables. For the remaining control 
variables, I allowed the CEM command to determine how to coarsen response categories 
                                                 
13 I also tested models using sample weights that matched on both partners’ characteristics. These models 
produced similar results to the models presented here. 
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within the variables. I applied the sampling weights generated from the CEM command 
to the uncoarsened data in both model sets. 
 
MODELING 
I present mixed effects regression models in this analysis. This method of 
regression allows for both random effects for factors like race that remain constant across 
the duration of the longitudinal analysis and fixed effects considering the within sample 
variation for factors like job tenure that might change one or more times during the panel. 
Mixed effects regression controls for any intra-subject correlation, making it useful for 
longitudinal data where the same individual has repeated measures over the life of the 
panel.14 
I lagged all independent variables by one year in all models, so these models 
describe the relationship between the husband’s involvement, female-breadwinner status, 
the couple’s number of children, and other variables and controls at T1 on earnings at 
T1+12. I lagged these predictors because, analytically, I expected it to take time for the 
husband’s involvement and the couple’s relative earnings to manifest as a change in 
either partner’s earnings. I tested several lag times ranging from four months to 24 
months as well as testing models where variables were not lagged. The 12-month lag 
produced the best fitting models. The female-breadwinner status variable was derived 
from the couple’s joint earnings and is therefore correlated with absolute earnings. I 
address this concern by looking at change in individual earnings over time instead of 
                                                 
14 In the models, race is the only variable that does not vary over time and uses random effects and the 
remaining variables use fixed effects (husband’s reduced labor force participation, husband’s childcare 
contribution, female-breadwinner status, number of young children, total number of children, region, age, 
occupation, work hours, and job tenure). 
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absolute earnings and by implementing the lagged structure, which means that female-
breadwinner status at T1 was compared to income at T1 + 12. 
 Each of the regression tables presents a set of nested models where logged 
earnings was regressed on lagged female-breadwinner status, husband’s childcare 
involvement, and husband’s reduce labor force participation. The first model presents a 
base model with no interactions and the following models add interactions to the base 
model. 
 
Results 
CHANGE IN WIFE’S EARNINGS 
Table 3.3 presents results for the first set of mixed effect regression models. 
Wife’s logged earnings was regressed on female-breadwinner status, husband’s childcare 
involvement, and husband’s reduced labor force participation during the prior year. 
Model 1 was a base model with controls for both husband and wife’s demographic and 
human capital characteristics. 15 Model 2 added an interaction between female-
breadwinner status and husband’s reduced labor force participation to Model 1. Model 3 
added an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband’s childcare 
contributions to Model 1. Model 4 added an interaction between female-breadwinner 
status and both husband and wife’s occupations to Model 1.16 
[Insert Table 3.3] 
                                                 
15 Demographic and human capital characteristics include age, age squared, occupation, work hours, job 
tenure, education, and race 
16 I also tested for interaction effects between female-breadwinner status and husband’s contributions to 
childcare as well as between female-breadwinner status and number of children and number of young 
children.  
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The coefficient for female-breadwinner status was positive and significant in all 
models.17 Wives in female-breadwinner households experienced greater increases in 
earnings than wives in male-breadwinner/equal-earner households even after controlling 
for human capital and demographic characteristics.  
As expected both the total number of children under age 17 and the number of 
children under age 10 suppressed wives’ earnings growth. Any child suppressed wives’ 
earnings growth with an additional penalty if the child is young. This mirrors research on 
the motherhood penalty finding that mothers experience a reduction in pay for each child 
that persists after considering differences in human capital and occupational segregation 
(see Budig and England 2001). The couple’s geographic region affected the wife’s 
earnings growth. Wives living in the Midwest and West both experienced slower 
earnings growth than wives in the Northeast. Wives in the South also experienced 
depressed earnings growth, but the results were not statistically significant.  
I also included controls for the wife and husband’s occupation to address 
occupational variation in work requirements, work culture, and occupational sex 
segregation. Compared to professionals and managers, wives in technical, service, and 
clerical occupations saw slower wage growth while wives in sales and blue 
collar/manufacturing occupations saw slightly faster wage growth, although the 
coefficient for blue collar/manufacturing is only significant in Model 4 which adds an 
interaction between female-breadwinner status and both wife’s and husband’s 
occupation.  
Model 2 adds an interaction term between female-breadwinner status and 
husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare. The interaction and main 
                                                 
17 Since I logged the dependent variable, these figures show the expected percentage change in income for 
an average household with all other variables held constant. 
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effects were positive, but only the main effects were significant. Figure 3.1 shows these 
coefficients. Wives in households where the husband had reduced his labor force 
participation for childcare at some point experienced a larger increase in earnings 
compared to wives whose husbands had never worked part time or not worked for pay for 
childcare reasons. This was true for wives in both categories of households and supports 
Hypothesis 1, that husband’s involvement in childcare had a positive association with 
wives’ earnings growth.  
Model 3 included an interaction between female-breadwinner status and 
husband’s childcare involvement. The main effects were positive and significant, but the 
interaction term was negative and significant and served as a correction for the 
uninteracted female-breadwinner effect in Model 1. Figure 3.3 shows these relationships: 
wives in both household categories experienced larger increases in earnings when the 
husband had a medium or high score on the involvement scale than when he had a low 
score. This supports Hypothesis 3.  
 [Insert Figures 3.1-3.4]  
 [Insert Figure 3.5] 
Occupations characterized by less flexible or family-friendly scheduling 
suppressed wives’ wage growth. We can see this with the female breadwinner 
interactions for wives in sales and blue collar/manufacturing occupations as well as wives 
whose husbands worked in service, sales, and blue collar/manufacturing occupations. 
Even though the wives earned at least 70% of the couple’s combined earnings, these 
husbands were working in occupations characterized by demanding schedules, so the 
wives were less likely to receive support for reproductive labor at home. This reinforces 
Cha’s (2010) finding that women with husbands who overwork have weaker labor force 
attachment, especially when the woman works in an occupation that also demands long 
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hours and is characterized by a lack of flexibility. Although these women are the primary 
breadwinners in their households, these results suggest that the couples where the 
husband worked in an occupation that is characterized by overwork did not embrace the 
wife’s status as a breadwinner and she was not making or was not able to make work 
decisions that increase her earnings. 
 
CHANGE IN HUSBAND’S EARNINGS 
The second set of models presented in Table 3.3 uses the same methods and 
controls as the models from Table 3.4, substituting husband’s logged earnings for the 
wife’s earnings. While husband’s reduced labor force participation, husband’s 
involvement in childcare, and the couple’s female-breadwinner status all had positive and 
significant effects on wives’ earnings growth, the same was not true for husbands’ 
earnings growth. The coefficients for female-breadwinner status were negative and 
significant, indicating that husbands in female-breadwinner households experienced 
smaller increases in earnings than similar husbands in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
households. This suggests that couples in female-breadwinner households may be acting 
as Becker (1981) suggests and were making rational decisions to maximize the woman’s 
superior earning power within the relationship at the husband’s expense. However, 
counter to Becker’s explanation, this rational decision-making process does not 
necessarily end with a traditional division of labor, but a decidedly non-traditional one. 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
One notable difference from the previous model set was the impact of children on 
change in earnings. The impact for the presence of children under age 18 was negative, 
but the coefficient for young children under age 10 was positive. That is, husbands with 
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children under 10 years of age experienced a higher rate of salary increase than husbands 
without young children. This was not the case for wives’ salary, and the presence of 
children regardless of age depressed wives’ earnings growth, suggesting that the effect of 
young children on earnings growth operated differently for wives and husbands.  
The relationship for geographic region also differed between husbands and wives 
with all of the coefficients acting in the opposite direction. Couples living in the Midwest, 
West, and South saw a larger increase in husbands’ earnings than those in the Northeast, 
though only the results for the South were significant.  
Model 2 adds an interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband’s 
reduced labor force participation for childcare. The main effects and interaction term 
were significant and negative, providing support for Hypothesis 2. Figure 3.2 shows that 
husbands who have ever reduced their labor force participation for childcare experienced 
a smaller increase in earnings than those who did not, but the coefficient for reduced 
labor force participation was stronger for husbands in female-breadwinner households. 
Model 3 adds an interaction between husband’s childcare involvement and 
female-breadwinner status. Figure 3.4 illustrates these relationships and provides partial 
support for Hypothesis 4. The main effect for female-breadwinner status remained 
negative and significant, but the effect for husband’s involvement was not significant. 
The interaction between female-breadwinner status and husband’s involvement was 
negative and significant, indicating that only husbands in female-breadwinner households 
experienced negative consequences in terms of earnings growth for their higher rates of 
childcare involvement.  
Model 4 includes an interaction term for female-breadwinner status and both 
husband and wife’s occupation. The interaction terms for female-breadwinner status and 
occupation were negative and significant for all of the wife’s occupations except sales 
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and blue collar/manufacturing and positive for all of the husband’s occupations. This 
indicates that, compared to husbands with breadwinning wives in professional 
occupations, husbands with breadwinning wives in all other occupations except sales and 
blue collar/manufacturing saw a smaller change in earnings. The opposite was true for the 
interaction between husband’s occupation and female-breadwinner status; all of the 
coefficients were positive, indicating that, compared to husbands in professional 
occupations, husbands in all other occupations with breadwinning wives saw a larger 
percent increase in earnings.  
[Insert Figure 3.6 and 3.7] 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 compare the coefficients from both model sets and show how 
the impact of living in a female-breadwinner household on earnings growth varies by 
gender. Husbands who lived in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households 
experienced the largest percentage and dollar increase in monthly earnings, followed by 
wives in female-breadwinner households, wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner 
households and then husbands in female-breadwinner households. These figures also 
depict the change in monthly earnings, so the disparity widens when compounded over 
the course of a year or lifetime. This suggests that the breadwinning premium is not 
gender neutral because husbands and wives who specialized in breadwinning did not 
receive similar premiums in earnings growth, supporting Hypotheses 5. I did not find 
support for Hypothesis 6, however. Husbands in female-breadwinner households did not 
receive any premium; they in fact received a penalty.  
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Discussion 
In these analyses, I examined the relationship between individual earnings over 
time and each partner’s contributions to earnings and childcare within the home. Female-
breadwinner households provide a case where the traditional division of labor is 
disrupted, allowing for the possibility of wives who specialize in breadwinning with the 
support of husbands who contribute significantly at home. I investigate whether a gender-
neutral breadwinner premium and caregiver penalty exist, or if the penalty and premium 
are gendered. Can women experience a breadwinner premium when they are the primary 
earner, and do men experience a caregiver penalty when they contribute to reproductive 
labor in the home?  
Both model sets show that wives in female-breadwinner households experienced 
larger increases in earnings than wives in equal-earner and male-breadwinner households; 
however, wives in both categories of households experienced lower increases in earnings 
than breadwinning or equal earning husbands, even after controlling for occupation and 
human capital and demographic characteristics. Husbands in female breadwinner 
households experienced the smallest increases in earnings of all groups, even smaller 
than wives in male-breadwinner households. After controlling for human capital and 
demographic variables, women experienced a breadwinner premium when they provided 
most of the family’s earnings, but it was much smaller in magnitude than that 
experienced by men. The breadwinner premium is gendered. Even when women 
specialized in breadwinning, they were held back by discrimination in the workplace or 
by an unwillingness to cede as much responsibility for reproductive labor as 
breadwinning husbands often do. However, the caregiver penalty can apply to both men 
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and women, a finding supported by the multitude of research that has documented the 
negative effects of reproductive labor on both men’s and women’s careers.  
Husband’s contributions to childcare were associated with larger increases in 
wife’s earnings, but did not always negatively affect the husband’s own earnings growth. 
I found a positive relationship between wife’s earnings growth and both husband’s 
reduced labor force participation for childcare and husband’s childcare involvement. This 
is consistent with descriptions from interview studies of women scaling back or quitting 
their jobs because their workplace is hostile to family responsibilities and/or their 
husbands are unwilling to contribute equally or at all to the second shift (Hochschild 
1989; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007). Women experience better career outcomes when 
they have support for reproductive labor at home. 
The impact of husband’s contribution to childcare on the husband’s own earnings 
growth differed for the two measures included in the models. Husband’s reduced labor 
force participation for childcare was negatively associated with husband’s earnings 
growth. Husband’s childcare involvement suppressed husband’s earnings growth, but 
only for husbands in female-breadwinner households. The differing results for these two 
measures of husband’s contributions to reproductive labor are at least partially explained 
by the type of contribution and how it interferes with working. Reducing labor force 
participation interferes with the accumulation of human capital and potentially job tenure 
if the husband’s job changes because of a leave of absence or a reduction to a part-time 
schedule. Table 3.4 shows that there were fewer husbands who have reduced their labor 
force participation for childcare in the highest category for job tenure. However, being 
currently involved in childcare activities did not always have a negative association with 
earnings growth because it did not necessarily mean the husband was diverting attention 
away from his career. Table 3.6 shows that the job tenure was more evenly distributed 
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across husband’s childcare involvement. Time spent in childcare activities can come from 
time normally spent on leisure activities and could be taking place outside of work hours 
or on non-work days. Time-use studies looking at parents’ childcare contributions find 
that women are more likely than men to be responsible for weekday childcare 
responsibilities, including assisting with homework and caring for sick children and that 
men are more likely to contribute to childcare on weekends (Maume 2008; Maume 
2011). However, the positive relationship between husband’s childcare involvement and 
wife’s earnings growth and the negative relationship for husbands in female-breadwinner 
households suggest that at least some of the husband’s care is relieving the wife’s 
responsibility for childcare. 
This analysis has limitations that are important to note. First, while the 2008 SIPP 
contains measures of the husband’s contributions to childcare and interactions with 
children, it did not ask similar questions about the wife’s contributions to childcare. 
Although we do know that some husbands are contributing more than other husbands, I 
am not able to determine if husband’s contributions reduce the amount of childcare 
contributed by mothers. Second, while I include two measures of husband’s contributions 
to childcare, this does not capture all of the childcare and housework that they are 
performing and presents a potential threat to the face validity of the scale. A better scale 
would have also considered how much time husbands contributed toward childcare 
(ideally as a percentage of total parental childcare time) or husbands’ involvement in 
more essential care tasks like meal preparation, transportation, and emergency or 
weekday care for children. The current scale remains a useful measure, however, because 
it considers the types of childcare tasks that men are most likely to perform.  
This analysis supports explanations of the caregiver penalty and breadwinner 
premium that treat it as a problem extending beyond decision made by individuals or 
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families. There are two primary components to the gender pay gap: men and women’s 
unequal responsibility for reproductive labor and the incompatibility of the ideal worker 
norm with the needs of children and families. Regarding the first component, when 
couples adopt a more gender egalitarian division of labor or have a wife that specializes 
in breadwinning, the husband’s career suffers. This disincentivises men from contributing 
equally at home and harms women’s careers instead. However, even in couples who are 
engaging in more egalitarian childcare and work practices or who flip the traditionally 
defined gender roles, this analysis did not find a breadwinner premium for women that is 
analogous to the fatherhood premium experienced by men. The often-made call for men 
to change their behavior fails to address the role of the culture of work that is hostile to 
the family and caregiving needs of its workers.   
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Female-Breadwinner Households by Wife’s Income 
Wife's Income by Decile 
Male-Breadwinner 
and Equal-Earner 
Households 
Female-Breadwinner 
Households 
Total 
(Lower Income)              1 0.11 0.11 0.11 
        
2 0.10 0.09 0.10 
        
3 0.10 0.11 0.11 
        
4 0.10 0.07 0.10 
        
5 0.10 0.11 0.10 
        
6 0.10 0.09 0.10 
        
7 0.11 0.11 0.11 
        
8 0.10 0.08 0.10 
        
9 0.10 0.12 0.10 
        
(Higher Income)            10 0.08 0.10 0.08 
        
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 4567 1013 5580 
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Table 3.2: Means by Female-Breadwinner Status 
  
Total 
MBW & 
Equal-earner 
Female 
Breadwinner 
  
Dependent Variable 
    Wife's Monthly Earnings $2,931 $2,683 $4,052 *** 
Husband's Monthly Earnings $4,480 $5,369 $2,947 *** 
Independent Variables 
    Husband's Involvement  2.0 2.0 2.1 
 Husband's Reduced LFP .06 .05 .08 * 
Controls 
    Number of Kids 1.8 1.8 1.8 
 Number of Kids <10 1.2 1.2 1.1 
 Region 
    Northeast .19 .19 .20 
 Midwest .23 .23 .20 
 West .25 .25 .26 
 South .33 .33 .33 
 Wife's Characteristics 
    Wife's Age 38.3 38.2 38.7 
 Wife's Occupation 
   
* 
Professional .36 .36 .34 
 Technical .11 .10 .12 
 Service .17 .17 .20 
 Sales .08 .07 .09 
 Clerical .21 .23 .16 
 Blue Collar .07 .07 .09 
 Wife's Job Tenure 6.1 6.1 6.4 
 Wife's Work Hours 36.5 36.4 36.9 
 Wife's Education 
    Less than High School .06 .06 .08 
 High School Graduate .19 .19 .20 
 Some College .36 .37 .34 
 College Graduate .38 .39 .38 
 Wife's Race 
    White .72 .72 .71 
 Black .07 .07 .06 
 Asian or Other .09 .09 .10 
 Hispanic/Latino .12 .12 .13 
 Husband's Characteristics 
    Husband's Age 40.7 40.5 41.8 
 Husband's Occupation 
   
*** 
Professional .46 .41 .70 
 Technical .02 .03 .01 
 Service .09 .09 .06 
 Sales .07 .07 .03 
 Clerical .05 .06 .04 
 Blue Collar .31 .34 .16 
 Husband's Job Tenure 6.2 6.1 6.4 
 Husband's Work Hours 39.8 42.1 38.7 * 
Husband's Education 
   
** 
Less than High School .10 .10 .11 
 High School Graduate .27 .26 .28 
 Some College .34 .34 .33 
 College Graduate .29 .30 .28 
 Husband's Race 
    White .70 .70 .69 
 Black .07 .07 .08 
 Asian or Other .09 .09 .10 
 Hispanic/Latino .14 .14 .13  
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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Table 3.3: Wife’s Log Earnings Mixed Effects Regression, 12-Month Lag (N=54,137) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female Breadwinner (FBW) 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.15 *** 0.12 *** 
Husband's Reduced LFP 0.10 *** 0.09 * 0.10 *** 0.02 *** 
FBW*Husband's RLFP 
 
  0.01   
 
  
 
  
Husband's Involvement 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(Low) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Medium 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 
High 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 
FBW*Husband's Involvement 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
FBW*Medium 
 
  
 
  -0.03 * 
 
  
FBW*High 
 
  
 
  -0.04 * 
 
  
Number of Kids -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 
Number of Kids <10 -0.02 ** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** -0.01 ** 
Region 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(Northeast) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Midwest -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** 
West -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 
South -0.03   -0.03   -0.03   -0.03   
Wife's Occupation 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(Professional/Managerial) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Technical -0.03 * -0.03 * -0.04 * -0.05 ** 
Service -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** 
Sales 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 
Clerical -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** 
Blue Collar/Manuf. 0.04   0.04   0.04   0.05 * 
FBW*Wife's Occupation 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Technical 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.06 * 
Service 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.01   
Sale 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.06 * 
Clerical 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.00   
Blue Collar/Manuf. 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.08 * 
Husband's Occupation 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(Professional/Managerial) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Technical 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.12 *** 
Service 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.03   0.05 ** 
Sales -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.05 ** 
Clerical 0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   
Blue Collar/Manuf. 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.02   0.04 ** 
FBW*Husband's Occupation 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Technical 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.09   
Service 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.07 ** 
Sale 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.11 ** 
Clerical 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.01   
Blue Collar/Manuf. 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.05 ** 
Wife's Race 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(White) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Black 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.18 *** 
Asian or Other 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 * 
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino 0.08   0.08   0.08   0.08   
Husband's Race 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(White) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Black -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.19 *** 
Asian or Other -0.08 * -0.08 * -0.08 * -0.09 * 
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino -0.06   -0.06   -0.06   -0.06   
Constant 0.12   0.10   0.12   0.13   
Note: Models control for wife and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure. 
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
 82 
Table 3.4: Husband’s Log Earnings Mixed Effect Regression, 12-Month Lag (N=54,137) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female Breadwinner (FBW) -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.17 *** -0.24 *** 
Husband's Reduced LFP -0.09 * -0.05 * -0.09 * -0.08 * 
FBW*Husband's RLFP     -0.16 ***     
 
  
Husband's Involvement     
 
      
 
  
(Low)     
 
      
 
  
Medium -0.01   -0.01   0.01   -0.01   
High -0.02   -0.02   -0.02   -0.02   
FBW*Husband's Involvement     
 
      
 
  
FBW*Medium     
 
  -0.04 * 
 
  
FBW*High     
 
  -0.03 * 
 
  
Number of Kids -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 
Number of Kids <10 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 
Region     
 
      
 
  
(Northeast)     
 
      
 
  
Midwest 0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   
West 0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   
South 0.06 * 0.06 * 0.06 * 0.06 * 
Wife's Occupation     
 
      
 
  
(Professional/Managerial)     
 
      
 
  
Technical -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   0.01   
Service -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.04 * 
Sales 0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 * 0.04   
Clerical -0.02   -0.02   -0.03   -0.01   
Blue Collar/Manuf. -0.01   0.00   0.00   0.01   
FBW*Wife's Occupation     
 
      
 
  
Technical     
 
      -0.22 *** 
Service     
 
      -0.50 *** 
Sale     
 
      0.34 *** 
Clerical     
 
      -0.24 *** 
Blue Collar/Manuf.     
 
      -0.12   
Husband's Occupation     
 
      
 
  
(Professional/Managerial)     
 
      
 
  
Technical -0.12 ** -0.12 * -0.12 * -0.17 *** 
Service 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.09 *** 
Sales -0.02   -0.02   -0.02   -0.06 *** 
Clerical 0.01   0.01   0.01   -0.03   
Blue Collar/Manuf. 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 
FBW*Husband's Occupation     
 
      
 
  
Technical     
 
      0.30 ** 
Service     
 
      0.16 *** 
Sale     
 
      0.73 *** 
Clerical     
 
      0.45 *** 
Blue Collar/Manuf.     
 
      0.12 *** 
Wife's Race     
 
      
 
  
(White)     
 
      
 
  
Black -0.12   -0.12   -0.12   -0.12   
Asian or Other -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.17 * 
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino 0.14   0.15   0.15   0.12   
Husband's Race     
 
      
 
  
(White)     
 
      
 
  
Black 0.07   0.07   0.07   0.07   
Asian or Other 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 * 0.16 ** 
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino -0.18 * -0.18 * -0.19 * -0.16 * 
Constant 0.01   -0.01   0.02   0.01   
Note: Models control for wife and husband's age, age squared, education, work hours, and job tenure. 
* p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
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Table 3.5: Crosstabs for Husband’s Tenure and Reduced Labor Force Participation 
  
Husband Ever Reduced  
Labor Force Participation 
  
  No Yes Total 
Husband's Tenure       
1 Year or Less .30 .31 .30 
2-5 Years .30 .28 .30 
6-10 Years .20 .25 .21 
>10 Years .20 .16 .20 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Crosstabs for Husband’s Tenure and Childcare Involvement 
  Husband's Childcare Involvement   
  Low Average High Total 
Husband's Tenure         
1 Year or Less .31 .30 .30 .30 
2-5 Years .30 .30 .31 .30 
6-10 Years .20 .21 .20 .20 
>10 Years .19 .19 .19 .19 
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Figure 3.1 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation, 
and Change in Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 2 in Table 3.2. 
Husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare and female-
breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant 
at their average or omitted value. 
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Figure 3.2 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Reduced Labor Force Participation, 
and Change in Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 2 in Table 3.3. 
Husband’s reduced labor force participation for childcare and female-
breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant 
at their average or omitted value.  
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Figure 3.3 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Involvement, and Change in Wife’s 
Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 3 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
Husband’s childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status were 
varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or 
omitted value. 
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Figure 3.4 Female-Breadwinner Status, Husband’s Involvement, and Change in 
Husband’s Earnings: Coefficients were taken from Model 3 in Tables 3.2 
and 3.3. Husband’s childcare involvement and female-breadwinner status 
were varied and all other coefficients were held constant at their average or 
omitted value. 
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Figure 3.5 Female-Breadwinner Status, Occupation, and Change in Earnings: 
Coefficients were taken from Model 4 in Table 3.2. Occupation and female-
breadwinner status were varied and all other coefficients were held constant 
at their average or omitted value. 
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Figure 3.6 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings as Percent 
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Figure 3.7 Female-Breadwinner Status and Change in Earnings in Dollars 
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CHAPTER 4: WOMEN’S CAREER ATTITUDES AND 
ANTICIPATED CHILDCARE SUPPORT 
 
Introduction 
Research describing the link between childcare and mothers’ lower earnings 
argues that an egalitarian distribution of reproductive labor18 is a necessary precondition 
for reducing or eliminating the motherhood penalty. (Williams 2010). A majority of 
young adults prefer an egalitarian division of labor when envisioning their future family 
lives, but they are skeptical that they will be able to achieve this goal (Gerson 2011). 
Mothers are pushed out of well-paid but demanding jobs and toward the home because 
institutions do not make allowances for childcare or other forms of reproductive labor. 
Having a husband or partner who contributes significantly to childcare may moderate this 
push by making the task of combining market and household labor more attainable. My 
research investigates how anticipated support for childcare affects women’s preferences 
for balancing work and family life. 
Survey and interview research looking at the relationship between men’s 
contributions to childcare and women’s careers is limited because couples self-select into 
gender-egalitarian or traditional work and family arrangements based on preferences and 
other factors that these studies can only partially account for. This makes it difficult to 
isolate the effects of men’s contributions to childcare on women’s careers. My analysis 
uses a factorial experimental design to overcome this limitation by using random 
                                                 
18 Reproductive labor maintains people in daily life and from generation to generation (Glenn 1992). It 
encompasses routine daily chores like cooking, cleaning, and childcare, and as well as less structured 
activities like emotional work in maintaining family relationships and continuing cultural and ethnic 
traditions. 
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assignment into conditions that vary childcare arrangements to look at the relationship 
between anticipated partner support for childcare and career attitudes. I investigate the 
primary research question: How do anticipated contributions to childcare from their 
future partners affect women’s career attachment and aspirations?  
I look at two components of husband’s contributions to childcare: the amount of 
childcare he performs and the quality of the childcare he contributes. Mothers’ careers 
suffer when fathers do not contribute to childcare or ignore women’s requests for support 
(Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Folbre 2010). Women 
are responsible for most of the day-to-day reproductive labor like housework, emotional 
labor, and childcare that is necessary to maintain individuals and families. In the case of 
childcare, while women are held accountable for “intensive mothering” (Hays 1997), 
men “babysit” their own children and are praised as outstanding fathers and husbands for 
performing routine childcare tasks (Williams 2000).  
Differing standards and differences in personal accountability hinder couples’ 
attempts to share childcare (Stone 2007). Women report stress from disagreements about 
the quality of tasks completed by their husbands and describe redoing household tasks 
that they considered inadequately completed (Hochschild 1989). Hochschild (1989) 
described husbands in her sample who avoided childcare or housework responsibilities 
through strategic incompetence—unknowingly or purposefully doing a bad job when 
they completed tasks. These and other studies indicate that quality of childcare is also an 
important factor when considering how anticipated spousal support for childcare will 
impact women’s attitudes and expectations about their careers.  
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Review of Literature 
Although women’s labor force participation patterns increasingly mirror those of 
men, the gender pay gap persists in the form of a motherhood penalty and a fatherhood 
premium. Workplaces are designed around an ideal worker that marginalizes men and 
women who have family responsibilities (Acker 1990). Despite movement toward greater 
sharing of home tasks, women are still responsible for most of a household’s reproductive 
labor including housework and childcare (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; Gornick and 
Meyers 2003, Folbre 2010). Since the 1960s, women’s time spent on housework 
(excluding childcare tasks) has been halved while men’s has doubled (Bianchi et al 
2000). During this same period, both women and men have increased their time spent on 
childcare (Bianchi 2000). Yet, most of men’s increases in time spent caring for children 
occur outside of their workweek (Maume 2008). Women are more likely than men to be 
responsible for both childcare during the workweek and for unscheduled or emergency 
care like picking up a sick child from school. 
In addition to spending more time on routine tasks like monitoring homework and 
non-routine childcare tasks like planning a birthday party, women are more likely to 
perform household or childcare tasks that require emotional labor (Hochschild 1989; 
Williams 2000). Keeping track of doctors’ appointments, learning and remembering 
preferences for food, and noticing that a child is about to outgrow her shoes are necessary 
but are not routine, so the work that goes into tasks of emotional labor often goes 
unnoticed. Emotional labor is also required when managing the household; even when 
men contribute to childcare or housework, women are often responsible for knowing 
what needs to be done to keep family life running smoothly, assigning tasks to household 
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members, noticing if tasks are forgotten or done incorrectly, and making sure that 
forgotten tasks get completed by reminding someone or doing the task themselves. 
Research describing the link between women’s responsibility for childcare and 
their suppressed careers and earnings potential often points to a more egalitarian 
distribution of household responsibilities as an essential part of the solution (see Williams 
2000, 2010). Gerson (2011) argues that a majority of young adults prefer gender 
egalitarian divisions of labor in her interview study of adults born in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This sample and subsequent generations are especially relevant for research on the 
division of household labor and family formations because Gerson’s respondents grew up 
during the “gender revolution” when standards for family formations widened from a 
male-breadwinner/female-homemaker arrangement to include dual-income couples. This 
shift in work patterns resulted in an increase in the proportion of households in which all 
adults work, creating a time squeeze as dual income couples work full-time jobs while 
juggling childcare and household responsibilities (Jacobs and Gerson 2004). 
Although Gerson’s respondents tended to state preferences for relationships with 
an egalitarian division of labor, they frequently expressed skepticism as to whether they 
would be able to achieve this ideal within their own households. The men and women 
perceived that their workplaces were inflexible and made it difficult to combine work and 
family without sacrificing quality on one or both fronts. This mirrors Stone’s (2007) 
study of highly educated women who decided to leave their careers after failing to find a 
balance between the demands of work and home. 
A common theme in studies of work-family conflict is how the household 
division of labor exacerbates or ameliorates women’s experiences at work. Men and 
women experience similar pressures at work, but respond to them differently. Pyke 
(1996) describes the hegemony of the male career as a consequence of a traditional 
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household division of labor in which the woman shoulders most of the household tasks 
that then distracts from her career. This dynamic creates or widens disparities in the 
couple’s career prospects and provides a rational foundation for sustaining the unequal 
distribution of responsibility for maintaining the household and supporting the family 
financially. In the U.S., men tend to slightly increase their work hours after having 
children while women tend to slightly decrease their work hours (Jacobs and Gerson 
2004). Stone (2007) describes what she calls the yellow light phenomenon where both 
men and women express willingness to slow down their careers after having children but 
women are much more likely to follow through and redirect some of their focus toward 
the home while men are more likely to speed up and redouble their efforts at work.  
Stone (2007), Hochschild (1989, 1997), and Blair-Loy (2003) describe couples in 
their samples where women were primarily responsible for reproductive labor at home. 
Some of these couples voluntarily created an unequal division of labor because both 
partners wanted a male-breadwinner/female-homemaker division. The couples agreed 
that the wife either did not work for pay or performed some market work but that her 
financial contribution would be secondary to maintaining the home, caring for children, 
and supporting her husband’s career. Other women were unsatisfied with the unequal 
arrangement and spoke enviously of their husbands’ careers. These women were 
frustrated at their inability to combine their responsibilities at home with their careers and 
often pointed to a lack of support from their male partners as part of the problem. For the 
women in Stone’s (2007) study, husbands not contributing to the reproductive labor at 
home played a role in more than half of the women’s decision to quit their jobs.  
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PLANS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS 
Because of men’s and women’s different experiences with and reactions to 
responsibility for home and work, they differ in their reactions to the perceived 
incompatibility between the two. Gerson’s (2011) respondents expressed a preference for 
a dual-income household formation with an egalitarian division of reproductive labor, but 
developed fallback plans in case their first choice proved impossible or unlikely. These 
fallback plans differed by gender. Most of the women expressed reluctance to enter a 
relationship that left them economically dependent on their partner and forced them to 
sacrifice career goals. Women tended to prefer a self-reliant fallback plan where they 
prioritize their own wellbeing, emotional needs, and personal goals ahead of forming 
romantic partnerships.  
The men, however, most often describe a neo-traditional arrangement as their 
fallback position in which they focus on providing financially for the family while their 
partner is responsible for most of the household reproductive labor. Both men and women 
are reluctant to enter romantic relationships that compromise their careers. For men, this 
means doubling down on their careers after having children and expecting their wives to 
make career sacrifices. For women, however, this may mean avoiding or postponing 
romantic relationships because they recognize or fear that that an egalitarian division of 
labor will not be possible if they marry and/or have children and that they will be the one 
who does most of the work at home to the detriment of their professional lives and 
personal goals. 
Men and women’s experiences at work affect their preferences for a specific 
household division of labor. Pedulla and Thébaud’s (2015) experimental study looked at 
the relationship between men and women’s preferences for egalitarian, neo-traditional, or 
self-reliant household arrangements in the presence of workplace constraints. They 
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confirmed Gerson’s (2011) finding that men and women prefer an egalitarian division of 
labor when given the option. For women, this preference for an egalitarian arrangement 
was increased when they were primed to think about work place supportive policies, but 
men did not show any changes in their preferences.  
A multitude of research demonstrates that women are pushed out of the workplace 
and toward the home because institutions do not accommodate their need to provide care 
for children (Jacobs and Gerson 2001; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Pettit and Hook 
2009; Folbre 2010). Middle-class women who attempt to balance their work and life 
commitments by reducing their work hours or using other flexibility policies often find 
themselves marginalized within their workplace, put on the “mommy track,” or pushed 
out of their jobs altogether (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; Stone 2007; Stone and 
Ackerly 2013). Working-class women face similar stigma and their job opportunities and 
options for employment are limited because of their perceived or actual care 
responsibilities. Having a husband who contributes a high amount of childcare may 
moderate this push out of the workplace, possibly making the task of combining work 
and family responsibilities seem more attainable. 
Differences in standards for the quality of childcare and cleanliness sometimes 
hinder egalitarian distributions of household labor (Hochschild 1989; Williams 2000; 
Stone 2007). Women report having to redo household tasks completed by their husbands 
because they felt he completed the task inadequately. Both men and women reported 
added stress and relationship strain from spousal disagreements about the expected 
quality of household and childcare tasks. This consideration of perceived quality provides 
an avenue for examining how the ideology of intensive parenting, or more specifically of 
intensive mothering (Hays 1997), impacts women’s preferences for combining childcare 
responsibilities with their careers. Hays describes the cultural construction of intensive 
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mothering that portrays parenting as child centered, time intensive, and best performed by 
mothers. Intensive mothering rationalizes the special status of mothers in their children’s 
lives and encourages mothers to develop high and particular standards concerning how 
their children are raised and cared for and, by extension, how their homes are maintained. 
Although the intensification of parenting has also affected men, women still bear the 
brunt of these time-intensive parenting practices, as evidenced by fathers being described 
as “babysitting” their own children and being praised as exceptionally skilled or involved 
for demonstrating basic competence at parenting tasks (Williams 2000). Considering the 
quality of husbands’ contributions to childcare in the experimental manipulation will 
capture women’s reactions to this idea from intensive mothering that children must be 
cared for in a particular way and that, as mothers, the women are ultimately responsible 
for ensuring that the children are well and properly cared for. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
The survey-experimental research design will allow me to investigate how the 
anticipated availability of partner assistance in caring for children affects women’s 
expectations and attitudes about their careers. First, the literature describing mothers 
“opting out” of the labor force suggests that the anticipated amount of care provided by 
husbands will affect women’s career attitudes and preferences. I therefore predict that: 
 
H9. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) amount of childcare will 
increase (or decrease) women’s career attachment compared to the control 
condition. 
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H10. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) amount of childcare will 
increase (or decrease) women’s career aspirations compared to the control 
condition. 
 
Second, when considering how anticipated support for childcare impacts women’s 
career preferences, the quality as well as the amount of childcare husbands contribute is 
important. The model of intensive mothering and the association of women with the 
ultimate responsibility for children’s care and wellbeing, as well as literature discussing 
how men and women negotiate the division of household labor, suggest that the quality 
of childcare provided by husbands may have a significant and separate effect from the 
amount of childcare. Therefore, this project also addresses the effects of husbands’ 
perceived competency in family care. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H11. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) quality of childcare will 
increase (or decrease) women’s career attachment compared to the control 
condition. 
H12. Anticipating a husband that contributes a high (or low) quality of childcare will 
increase (or decrease) women’s career aspirations compared to the control 
condition. 
 
Finally, I expect the effects of amount and quality will interact and that a low 
value for one will mute a high value for the other. For example, in the case of a husband 
that provides a high amount of childcare but of a low quality, the negative effect of 
quality mute the positive effect of amount and I would expect to see a lower effect size 
for amount for this condition. I predict that: 
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H13. The effect of high or positive values for each of the two indicators will be muted 
by low or negative values for other indicators. 
 
Methods 
I collected original survey experiment data to address the research questions. I 
fielded the survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a platform where 
people perform small tasks like data entry, writing, or completing surveys in exchange 
for pay. Kress et al. (2017) compared MTurk samples to samples from professional panel 
samples and student panel samples and found the data from MTurk respondents was of 
equal or higher quality compared to data from the other sources after considering factors 
like responses to attention-check questions, reported rates of multi-tasking during the 
survey, and length and quality of open-ended responses. Buhrmester et al (2011) found 
that MTurk respondents have a high test-retest reliability that matched other data 
collection methods, indicating that respondents report the same attitudes or respond 
similarly to prompts when tested at different points in time.  
Although MTurk does not provide a nationally representative sample and differs 
in some demographic characteristics from nationally representative samples, comparisons 
between MTurk and online population-based panels show that both methods produce 
similar results (Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014). MTurk samples are generally 
more diverse than convenience and student samples, but fall short of national probability 
samples (Berinsky et al. 2012). MTurk samples are younger, have lower average incomes 
(likely related to lower age), and underrepresent Blacks and Hispanics compared to the 
national probability sample from the Current Population Survey (CPS). My study focuses 
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on the expectations and attitudes of younger women, so the underrepresentation of older 
participants will not affect the validity of this study. I will, however, need to consider the 
racial composition of my sample and its representativeness when considering the 
generalizability of my results. 
 
 
SAMPLE 
I used MTurk to recruit young (age 18-32), unpartnered women without children 
who lived in the United States. I limited the sample to women because research shows 
men’s career attitudes are not impacted as strongly by partner support for childcare 
(Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). Men do experience negative career 
consequences when they deviate from ideal worker norms for reasons related to childcare 
(Coltrane et al. 2013). However, women continue to hold primary responsibility for 
childcare and, therefore, are more likely to experience negative career consequences after 
having children. I further limited the sample to unpartnered women without children 
because women who are already married or have children are likely to have already made 
decisions about how to divide their commitments between family care and paid work 
with their partners, limiting the effectiveness of my manipulations. 
I aimed to recruit 1,495 participants to yield 166 participants in each of the nine 
experimental conditions. I used G*Power software to ensure that this sample size would 
yield enough statistical power to detect moderate effect sizes with an alpha level of 0.05. 
The survey sample size was 1,495.  
I included two manipulation checks at the end of the survey that asked 
participants to recall the qualities of their husband as described in their experimental 
prompt. Some respondents did not answer these questions correctly. I decided to exclude 
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these respondents from the final sample because I could not be confident that these 
participants noticed the experimental manipulations and answered the survey with the 
vignette in mind. After dropping these respondents, my final sample size was 1,105 with 
between 149 and 112 participants in each of the nine experimental conditions.  
 
SCREENER, PROMPT, AND MANIPULATIONS 
I fielded the survey between January 7, 2017 and February 3, 2017. I used MTurk 
to advertise the survey and recruit participants and then directed participants to the survey 
instrument hosted on Qualtrics Survey Platform. I directed potential participants to 
complete a pre-survey screener to ensure that the sample was restricted to unpartnered, 
childless women between the ages of 18 and 32 who lived in the United States. The 
screener contained relevant questions about age, gender, country of residence, number of 
children, and marital/relationship status. I also included additional demographic questions 
about race/ethnicity, education level, individual earnings, employment status, and 
political affiliation to use for subsequent analysis. The screener took less than five 
minutes to complete, and I paid participants $0.15 for completing the screener regardless 
of if they qualified for the survey experiment sample pool. 
Participants who met the criteria for the sampling frame were then directed to the 
survey instrument.19 The experimental vignette asked each participant to imagine that, 
several years in the future, she was married, had two young children, and worked full 
time. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions that varied husbands’ 
contributions to childcare along two axes (Figure 3.1). The first axis varied the amount of 
childcare he contributed (low, high, and control conditions). Vignettes directly stated that 
                                                 
19 The survey questions are included in Appendix 2. 
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the husband either did or did not assist with childcare-typed tasks. The second axis varied 
the quality of the childcare the he contributed (low, high, and control conditions). 
Vignettes described either how the participant could or could not rely on her husband to 
complete childcare tasks.20 
[Insert Figure 3.1] 
After reading the prompt, participants answered survey items that measured their 
career attitudes given the conditions described in the experiment prompt. Items included 
preferences for combining work and childcare, their willingness to increase work hours, 
and the importance of advancing at work. Figure 3.1 lists the exact question wording for 
each of the scale questions. The survey took less than ten minutes to complete, and I paid 
participants $0.55 for completing the survey in addition to the $0.15 for completing the 
screener. 
[Insert Figure 3.2] 
 
MEASURES 
I used two scales as dependent variables in this analysis. The first is the career 
attachment scale, created from the four questions listed in Figure 3.1. I designed the scale 
to measure to what degree the women are willing to sacrifice time at home or with family 
to advance or be a better employee at work. Each of these questions used a seven-point 
Likert scale with responses ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. I 
combined the scores for each of these responses to create the career attachment scale 
(alpha=.81). The scale ranged from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score of 24, 
and the mean score was 15.4. The second dependent variable was the career aspiration 
                                                 
20 The base prompt and prompts for each of the nine experimental conditions are included in Appendix 1. 
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scale which I created from the three questions listed in Figure 3.1 (alpha=.69). I designed 
this scale to measure how much the women value advancing at work. The questions also 
used a seven-point Likert scale indicating agreement with the items in the context of the 
experiment prompt. The scale ranged from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score 
of 18, and the mean score for the career aspirations scale was 10.4 
The models used two primary independent variables derived from the 
experimental manipulations. Quality of childcare described how well the husband 
provided childcare in the prompt. Amount of childcare described how much childcare the 
husband provided in the prompt. Both variables had three possible values: high, low, and 
a control condition in which the prompt did not mention the variable  
[Insert Table 3.1] 
I also collected basic demographic information about participants in the pre-
survey screener. Table 3.1 displays means/proportions and ranges for these variables. Age 
is a continuous variable with values ranging from 18 to 32. The average age was 24 and 
was consistent across the nine experimental conditions. Race was created from two 
questions asking if the person identified as Hispanic or Latino and to select the racial 
description(s) that best fit their identity. I collapsed responses into four categories: 
Black/Black Hispanic (13%), White non-Hispanic (63%), Hispanic (19%), and Other21 
(5%). Individual Income was a continuous measure of the respondent’s own earnings 
from working. The average for individual income was $42,184. Education is a 
categorical measure of the highest level of education completed. The largest response 
category was College Degree (37%), followed by High School Degree (28%), Some 
College (24%), and less than High School Degree (11%). Employed is a dummy variable 
                                                 
21 I included respondents who selected more than one race in the Other category. 
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indicating if the respondent was currently working for pay. Sixty-seven percent of 
respondents in the final sample were employed at the time of the survey. 
 
Results 
The main analysis consisted of two model sets that looked at the impact of the 
anticipated amount and quality of husband’s contributions to childcare on women’s 
career attitudes. Anticipated career attachment was the dependent variable for the first 
model set, and anticipated career aspirations was the dependent variable for the second 
model set. Table 3.2 shows both sets of regression models where the score on the 
anticipated career attitudes scales was regressed on anticipated amount and quality of the 
husband’s childcare. For both model sets, Model 1 included only amount and quality and 
Model 2 added an interaction between amount and quality. Amount and quality each had 
high, low, and control (omitted value) conditions. I start by discussing the results of the 
first model set using the career attachment scale and then move to the career aspiration 
scale in the following section. 
 
CAREER ATTACHMENT SCALE 
The coefficient for high amount of childcare was significant and positive ( p = 
0.011) in Model 1, indicating that the conditions for high amount were associated with 
higher scores on the career attachment scale than the control conditions. The coefficient 
for low amount was negative and marginally significant (p = 0.087), suggesting that the 
low amount prompt was associated with lower scores on the career attachment scale than 
the control condition. These coefficients provided support for Hypothesis 1. The 
coefficient for high quality was significant and positive (p = 0.029), but the coefficient 
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for the low quality condition was not significant and positive (p = 0.906)). This provided 
partial support for Hypothesis 3: the high quality condition was associated with higher 
scores on the career attachment scale than the control condition, but the low quality 
condition did not have a significantly different effect than the control condition.  
[Insert Table 3.2] 
Model 2 added an interaction between amount and quality. Several of the 
interaction terms were significant at the p = 0.01 level, indicating that adding the 
interaction improved the overall model fit. The coefficients for high amount and quality 
remained significant and positive (p = 0.008 and p = 0.006) and the coefficient increased 
in magnitude. This increase in magnitude was partially offset by the negative coefficients 
for the interaction terms. When the interaction effect was added, the negative coefficient 
for low quality reversed direction and dropped out of significance (p = 0.146). Figure 3.3 
illustrates the effects of amount and quality on career attachment. The condition for low 
amount and low quality was associated with scores on the attachment scale that were 
below the overall mean. Similarly, the condition for high amount and high quality was 
associated with scores above the overall attachment scale mean.  
[Insert Figure 3.3] 
Results differed for the two conditions where amount and quality had mismatched 
qualifiers. In the low amount and high quality condition, the suggestion that the husband 
did not contribute to childcare very often, but that the contributions he made were of high 
quality was still associated with attachment scale scores below the mean. The same was 
not true for the high amount and low quality condition; women tended to report above 
average career attachment when they were asked to anticipate a husband who contributed 
significantly to childcare tasks, but when his contributions were of low quality. This 
disparity between the effects of two mismatched conditions suggests that expected 
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amount of husband’s contributions to childcare might have a stronger impact on women’s 
anticipated career attachment than quality. 
 
CAREER ASPIRATIONS SCALE 
The second model set examined the relationship between the anticipated amount 
and quality of husband’s contributions to childcare and women’s career aspirations. As 
with the previous model set, Model 1 included only anticipated amount and quality and 
Model 2 added an interaction effect between anticipated amount and quality. The 
coefficient for low amount was significant (p = 0.030), and the coefficient for high 
amount was marginally significant (p = 0.059). Conditions with low anticipated amount 
were associated with lower scores on the career aspirations scale compared to the control 
condition, while the conditions with high anticipated amount were associated with higher 
scores on the career aspirations scale compared to the control condition. This provided 
support for Hypothesis 2.  
Moving to the conditions for quality, the coefficient for low quality was negative 
and significant, but the coefficient for high quality was not significant. Women tended to 
score lower on the career aspirations scale when primed with low quality conditions 
compared to their counterparts in control condition, but women’s scores on the career 
aspirations scale were not significantly affected by the high quality conditions. This 
provided partial support for Hypothesis 4. 
[Insert Figure 3.4] 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the effects of anticipated partner support for childcare on 
career aspirations. The effects for career aspirations are similar to those in the previous 
model set for career attachment. The high amount and high quality condition was 
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associated with the highest scores on the career aspiration scale at three-quarters of a 
point above the scale mean of 10.4 out of a possible 21. The low amount and low quality 
condition was associated with the lowest scores on the career aspiration scale at almost a 
full point below the mean. The mixed qualifier conditions were in the middle with the 
high amount and low quality condition associated with slightly higher scores than the low 
amount and high quality condition. As with the previous model set looking at career 
attachment, amount of childcare appeared to have a stronger impact on the career 
aspiration score than quality. 
Model 2 added an interaction between anticipated amount and quality of 
husband’s childcare. The main effects for both amount and quality dropped out of 
significance with only anticipated low amount remaining marginally significant (p = 
0.060). None of the interaction effects were significant. This indicated that anticipated 
amount and quality had separate and independent effects on the career aspirations scale 
and that the presence of one independent variable did not significantly impact the effect 
of the other independent variable. Mode 1 provided a better fit for looking at the 
relationship between career aspirations and anticipated future support for childcare. 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The analyses in Table 3.2 did not include women in the sample who incorrectly 
answered one or both of the manipulation check questions. Restricting the sample to 
respondents who correctly answered the manipulation check questions ensured that 
respondents read the experiment prompt and that they were primed by the manipulated 
experimental conditions. But excluding this group of respondents could have biased the 
results of the analysis if the women who failed the manipulation check differed from 
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those who passed the check and were included in the sample. To check for differences 
between the two groups, I started by looking at observable differences among the 
descriptive statistics collected in the survey. Using ANOVAs and t-tests, I did not find 
differences in education, race, age, or income between the two samples.22 
Next, I recreated the model sets from the previous section with the full sample. 
For both models sets, most of the results were similar between models using the full and 
restricted samples. The coefficients changed slightly in magnitude, but did not change 
direction or significance level. The only exception was Model 2 in the career aspirations 
model set that included an interaction between husband’s anticipated amount and quality 
of childcare. All of the interaction terms remained insignificant, but two of the 
coefficients changed direction. Otherwise, the restricted and full sample models were 
similar. This difference between results for the full and restricted sample for the second 
career aspirations model does not have a major effect on the results and interpretations of 
these analyses, however, because the coefficients are not significant in either model and 
Model 2 did not offer an improvement in fit over Model 1. 
 
Discussion 
Women and men consider how they will combine work and family when thinking 
about their future romantic relationships and how they would like to structure their family 
lives (Gerson 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015). They also make career decisions based 
upon their day-to-day household responsibilities, their ability to combine their work and 
family responsibilities successfully, and the support they receive from their romantic 
partners in managing the potential conflicts between these responsibilities (Blair-Loy 
                                                 
22 Means and ANOVA results are not shown. 
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2003; Stone 2007; Williams 2010). I built upon this foundation by looking at the 
relationship between future expectations of partner support for reproductive labor and 
women’s attitudes toward work. In this analysis, I used data from an original survey 
experiment to examine the relationship between the anticipated amount and quality of 
husband’s contribution to childcare and women’s expectations and attitudes about their 
careers. 
The first set of models regressed women’s score on the career attachment scale on 
the anticipated amount and quality of husband’s childcare. Both amount and quality of 
anticipated partner support increased women’s score on the career attachment scale. The 
effects of anticipated high amount and quality conditions were larger than the effects of 
the anticipated low amount and quality conditions for the career attachment scale.  
This indicates that either the low qualifier conditions do not have a strong effect 
on career attachment or that women were more likely to anticipate low amount and/or 
quality childcare from their future partners in the control condition, making their scores 
on the career attachment scale more similar to those of the women in the low amount and 
quality conditions. Gerson’s (2011) observations about women’s doubts about achieving 
an egalitarian division of labor and preferences for a self-reliant fallback position support 
the second explanation: women recognize the possibility that their partners will not 
contribute equally at home.  
The second set of models looked at the relationship between career aspiration and 
anticipated amount and quality of husband’s childcare. Anticipated amount and quality of 
husband’s childcare impacted women’s scores on the career aspirations scale: the low 
conditions for both amount and quality decreased women’s scores on the career 
aspirations scale and the high condition for amount increased women’s scores on the 
scale. 
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This analysis looked at two facets of partner provided childcare: the amount of 
childcare and the quality of childcare that was provided. This distinction between amount 
and quality is important because ideas of intensive mothering/parenting and the 
association of women with ultimate responsibility for children’s wellbeing encourages 
men and women to view and react differently to parenting responsibilities in ways that 
later impact their careers and earnings potential. It is not enough that children are 
adequately cared for. Instead, parents must spend time and emotional energy ensuring 
that their children’s lives are enriched to maximize their future wellbeing and 
opportunities for success (Hays 1998). Though mothers and fathers are equally capable of 
providing both basic care and intensive parenting, mothers are more frequently blamed 
when the child experiences problems or someone perceives the child’s care to be 
inadequate. This blame manifests in the form of comments at work about women 
neglecting their children in favor of their careers (Hochschild 1997; Blair-Loy 2003; 
Stone 2007) and in day-to-day conversation when people blame and critique the mothers 
of men who have committed crimes (Hays 1998). Anticipating having a husband who 
provides enough care only meets the most basic standards; the care also has to be of high 
quality to fulfill requirements of intensive parenting. This analysis affirms this point; 
women who were primed by reading about a future scenario where their husband 
contributed a high amount of childcare but the quality of the childcare did not meet the 
women’s standards reported lower career attachment and aspiration than the control 
group. Again, the effects of anticipated amount appeared to be slightly stronger than the 
effects of anticipated quality. 
There was an interaction effect between the anticipated amount and quality of 
partner’ childcare contributions and women’s scores on the career attachment scale. 
Amount and quality of childcare have an overlapping and moderating effect on women’s 
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career attachment. Women who were primed with a scenario where their husband 
contributed a high amount of childcare but whose contributions did not meet the 
women’s standards for childcare scored higher than the mean but not by much. This 
suggests that an egalitarian division of labor may only be part of a solution to women’s 
greater burden of reproductive labor—couples also need to have and meet similar 
standards of care.  
It is worth noting that while quality of care was significant and that women who 
were primed with both high amount and quality conditions had the highest scores for both 
career attitudes scales, amount appears to matter more than quality. In the mixed qualifier 
conditions for both scales, the high amount and low quality condition was associated with 
higher scores than the low amount and high quality condition. This analysis confirmed 
the observations in the literature that quality of men’s childcare does affect women’s 
thoughts about their careers. However, these results suggest that although women may 
have higher standards for childcare, they are willing to sacrifice their standards to invest 
in their careers.  
Women’s attitudes about their careers are shaped by their anticipated and actual 
support for childcare. Future research could expand on this project by examining how 
men’s attitudes about their careers are shaped by their anticipated and/or actual support 
for childcare. It is also worth considering that women and families receive help caring for 
their children from sources outside of the nuclear family. It is possible that actual or 
anticipated support from family members like older female relatives would have a similar 
impact on women’s perceived ability to manage market work while raising young 
children. 
Gerson’s (2011) study demonstrates that men and women think about how they 
will combine work and family responsibilities in their future relationships and recognize 
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that they may have to adjust their preferences to the realities of an inflexible work 
culture. The fact that both the anticipated amount of childcare and the quality of the 
childcare contributed by their partners affected career attachment and future aspirations 
suggests that there are two components to an egalitarian distribution of household labor 
between couples. A couple must agree on both standards for caring for children and day-
to-day household chores and agree to split the tasks evenly. Efforts to encourage 
egalitarian divisions of labor must contend with the ideology of intensive mothering that 
insists mothers should be the primary caretaker of their children as well as the ideal 
worker norm that discourages men from contributing to childcare and housework by 
marginalizing anyone who signals divided loyalties.  
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Table 4.1: Means and Proportions for Scales and Demographic Characteristics 
  Mean/Proportion Minimum Maximum 
Career Attachment 
Scale 15.4 0 24 
Career Aspirations 
Scale 10.4 0 18 
Age 24.3 18 32 
Race/Ethnicity 
   White 0.63 0 1 
Black 0.13 0 1 
Other 0.05 0 1 
Hispanic 0.19 0 1 
Individual Income $42,184  $0  $250,000  
Education 
   < High School 0.11 0 1 
High School 0.28 0 1 
Some College 0.24 0 1 
College Degree 0.37 0 1 
Employed 0.67 0 1 
N 1,105 
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Table 4.2: Career Attitudes Regressed on Anticipated Amount and Quality of Childcare 
  Career Attachment Career Aspirations 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Amount 
        (Control) 
        Low -0.468 + 0.181 
 
-0.624 * -0.675 + 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.702) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.060) 
 High 0.695 * 1.873 ** 0.390 + 0.458 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.201) 
 
         Quality 
        (Control) 
        Low 0.032 
 
0.687 
 
-0.456 * -0.464 
 
 
(0.906) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.195) 
 High 0.598 * 1.771 ** 0.257 
 
0.283 
 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.429) 
 
         Amount*Quality 
        (Control*Control) 
        Low*Low 
  
-0.506 
   
-0.006 
 
   
(0.448) 
   
(0.991) 
 Low*High 
  
-1.440 * 
  
0.157 
 
   
(0.031) 
   
(0.757) 
 High*Low 
  
-1.458 * 
  
0.030 
 
   
(0.029) 
   
(0.953) 
 High*High 
  
-2.078 * 
  
-0.235 
 
   
(0.020) 
   
(0.643) 
 
         Constant 15.08   14.47   10.54   10.53   
N 1,294 
 
1,294 
 
1,294 
 
1,294 
 * p=0.05 ** p=0.01 *** p=0.001 
       P-value in parentheses. 
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    Quality of Husband's Childcare 
    
High 
Quality 
Low 
Quality 
Control  
(No Quality) 
Amount of 
Husband's 
Childcare 
High Amount Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 
Low Amount Condition 4 Condition 5 Condition 6 
Control (No Amount) Condition 7 Condition 8 Condition 9 
Figure 4.1: Experimental Conditions 
 
Career Attachment Scale Career Aspiration Scale 
 
 I would be willing to work 
overtime to help my boss in a 
crunch. 
 If I were to have another 
child, I would want to take off 
four months or more for 
work.  
 If my child was sick, I would 
rather my husband be the 
parent to miss work.  
 I would take a promotion that 
required me to work five 
more hours each week. 
 
 
 I would be ambitious at 
work.  
 Being promoted at work 
would be important to me.  
 Moving into a higher 
management or executive 
position at work would be 
important to me. 
Figure 4.2 Career Attitudes Scale Questions: All questions in both scales used a seven-
point Likert scale for response options. Responses ranged from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. 
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Figure 4.3 Effect of Quantity and Quality on Attachment Scale: The figure shows the 
distance from the mean score on the career attachment scale (15.4 out of 28) 
for each of the combinations of low and high amount and low and high 
quality childcare. I used coefficients from Model 2 that includes an 
interaction between amount and quality. 
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Figure 4.4 Effects of Quantity and Quality on Aspiration Scale: The figure shows the 
distance from the mean score on the career aspiration scale (10.4 out of 21) 
for each of the combinations of low and high amount and low and high 
quality childcare. I used coefficients from the uninteracted first model. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
OVERVIEW 
In these analyses, I investigated how men’s contributions to reproductive labor 
affect the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium. I focused on female-
breadwinner households as a site for examining the distribution of childcare and its 
impact on earnings because it flips the traditional archetype of the breadwinner husband 
and homemaking wife. In this chapter, I start by providing an overview of the analyses in 
the previous three chapters with a focus on the key findings as well as practical and 
theoretical implications. I then conclude the chapter by talking about some limitations of 
these analysis and directions for future research on reproductive labor and the 
motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. 
In chapter two, I examined the differences between the division of household 
labor in female-breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households. I used data from 
the 2008 SIPP to compare the husband’s likelihood of reducing his labor force 
participation to care for children and the husband’s involvement in childcare in the two 
categories of households over a five year period. I used coarsened exact matching to 
address potential endogeneity of female-breadwinner status with respect to husband’s 
contributions. I matched female-breadwinner households and non-female-breadwinner 
households on wife’s education, race, occupation, and job tenure as well as the couple’s 
number of children age 10 to 17, number of children under age 10, and geographic region 
of residence. I expected that husbands in female-breadwinner households would have a 
higher likelihood of reducing their labor force participation for childcare and have higher 
levels of involvement with their children than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and 
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equal earner households. I found that husbands in female-breadwinner households were 
more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare. Husbands in 
managerial and technical occupations, which are more likely to offer flexibility benefits, 
were more likely to have reduced their labor force participation for childcare than 
husbands in other occupations. Husbands in female-breadwinner households also had 
higher levels of involvement in childcare than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and 
equal-earner households. However, the effects sizes were small, so the practical 
difference between the two groups was less than half a point on an 18-point scale despite 
the high level of statistical significance. Husbands who had reduced their labor force 
participation for childcare subsequently had higher levels of childcare involvement even 
after they returned to work compared to husbands who had never worked part time or not 
worked for a period of time specifically to care for children. Because the differences in 
involvement between female-breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households were 
small it is unlikely that breadwinning wives will be able to reduce their domestic labor 
enough to capture the same breadwinning premium that fathers see, even in cases where 
husbands perform more reproductive labor. 
These analyses suggest that husbands’ likelihood of reducing their labor force 
participation for childcare was limited by ability: husbands were more likely to have 
worked part time or not worked to care for children at some point in the past when they 
were not the primary earner in the household and when they worked in occupations that 
were more likely to offer flexibility benefits. Having modified their labor force 
participation for childcare in the past increased husbands involvement with children and 
had the potential to impact the household distribution of labor even when they returned to 
full-time work. My analysis supports the idea that structural constraints at work hinder an 
egalitarian distribution of labor at home.  
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In the third chapter, I investigated whether the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium in earnings are always gendered by looking at the case of female-
breadwinner households to find cases where mothers escape the penalty and even achieve 
a breadwinner premium. I used the 2008 SIPP to examine if providing childcare impacted 
husbands’ earnings and how receiving support for childcare from their husbands 
impacted wives’ earnings over a period of five years. I used CEM to match female-
breadwinner and non-female-breadwinner households on wife’s education, race, 
occupation, and job tenure as well as the couple’s number of children age 10 to 17 and 
number of children under age 10 and geographic region of residence. I wanted to test if 
the effects of providing or receiving support for childcare on earnings differed between 
female-breadwinner households and male-breadwinner/equal-earner households. Initially, 
the breadwinner effect appeared not to be gendered: wives in female-breadwinner 
households saw larger increases in earnings over time than their counterparts in male-
breadwinner/equal-earner households and men in female-breadwinner households saw 
smaller increases in earnings over time than their counterparts in male-breadwinner and 
equal-earner households. However, breadwinning wives still earned less than 
breadwinning/equal-earning husbands even after controlling for human capital and 
demographic characteristics. These discrepancies are likely conservative because I 
combined both breadwinning and equal earning husbands into a single group which I 
then compared to breadwinning wives. Women did experience a breadwinner premium, 
but it was lower in magnitude (both in dollars and in percent increase) than the premium 
experienced by men. The premium was gendered, but both men and women experienced 
a penalty for caregiving. 
In chapter four, I used an original survey experiment to look at how anticipated 
partner support for childcare impacted women’s career attitudes. In the previous two 
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chapters, I used coarsened exact matching and fixed effects to provide the strongest 
causal argument possible, but the possibility of self-selection into female-breadwinner 
households remained. I designed the survey experiment to further examine the link 
between men’s caregiving and women’s careers. 
Research on the gender pay gap in general and the motherhood penalty 
specifically points to an egalitarian distribution of labor in the home as necessary to 
achieving gender parity in earnings and career outcomes. I focused on two components of 
household labor: amount of labor performed and the quality of contributions. The 
experimental prompt described a future scenario where the women were married, had 
children, and both partners worked. I manipulated how much childcare the husband 
performed and the quality of his childcare contributions. Manipulations for both amount 
and quality of anticipated childcare support affected women’s career attitudes. Women 
who read about receiving more support or higher quality support from their future 
partners reported higher levels of career attachment and career aspirations than women 
who read about receiving less support or lower quality support. The effect was strongest 
when women read about receiving both high amounts of support and high quality 
support. The analysis confirmed my hypotheses that both quality and quality of 
anticipated partner contributions to childcare would impact women’s career attitudes. The 
effects of the low amount and quality conditions were also weaker than the effects of the 
high amount and quality conditions. There are two possible explanations: either the low 
qualifier conditions have a weak effect on career attachment or women tended to 
anticipate low amount and/or quality childcare from their future partners in the control 
condition, making their scores on the career attachment scale more similar to those of the 
women in the low amount and quality conditions. 
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The results of the survey experiment suggest that there are at least two significant 
components to an egalitarian distribution of labor: partners must both contribute similar 
amounts of work and they must also come to an agreement on how tasks should be 
completed and meet these shared standards in their contributions. One partner’s standards 
for childcare or housework are not necessarily superior or more correct, but the disparity 
in standards and in the quality of contributions has the potential to negatively impact the 
partner with the higher standards. Furthermore, expectations for a non-egalitarian 
distribution of housework and childcare has the potential to negatively impact women 
even before they form intimate partnerships and have children. 
 
STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This project combined empirical analysis of an existing nationally representative 
survey with analysis of results from an original survey experiment. The focus on female-
breadwinner households in two of the analyses is one of the major contributions of this 
dissertation because it demonstrates that the circumstances of an individual relationship 
are not enough to overcome the structural barriers to an egalitarian distribution of labor in 
the household or gender parity in earnings. I also complicate the idea of an egalitarian 
distribution of household labor in the survey experiment by separating quantity and 
quality of child care performed.  An egalitarian distribution of labor at home is also 
hindered by gendered ideas about parenting and responsibility for the home that result in 
men and women having different expectations for what it means to be a good mother or 
father. This research contributes to the argument that the gender pay gap is not the result 
of individual choice, it is supported and maintained by institutional constraints and 
gendered expectations of motherhood and fatherhood. 
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These analyses have limitations that are important to note. The analyses that used 
data from the 2008 SIPP only considered the impacts of men’s childcare on earnings and 
the differences in husband’s childcare between female-breadwinner and non-female 
breadwinner households. The absence of information about wives contributions to 
childcare in the dataset means that I could not consider how husband’s involvement in 
childcare impacted wives’ involvement in childcare. Maume (2008) suggests that 
husbands are more likely to contribute childcare on weekends than they are during or 
after a workday. It is possible that, although husbands in male-breadwinner household, 
who are in more flexible occupations, or who have reduced their labor force participation 
at some point in the past are contributing more than their counterparts, but I cannot show 
whether or not this lessens the childcare burden for wives. Female-breadwinner 
households are a growing population and there is a growing interest in men’s parenting in 
quantitative research, so it is likely that datasets in the next decade will allow for more 
comprehensive analyses of childcare in female-breadwinner households.  
Another avenue for future research would be to look at how future expectations 
for household division of labor and partner support impact pre- and early-career choices. 
Gerson (2011) demonstrates that men and women both prefer gender-egalitarian family 
formations, but are skeptical that they will be able to actualize their preferences in their 
future relationships. Pedulla and Thébaud (2015) further demonstrate that these 
preferences are impacted by structural constraints in the workplace. My survey 
experiment analysis suggests that expectations about future family formations have the 
potential to impact career attitudes in young adulthood before people marry and have 
children. My results are limited in their generalizability because I only sampled women. 
The findings of these three studies are compelling, but are limited because they ask about 
expected or anticipated behavior. The argument that expectations about division of labor 
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in future relationships and ability to combine work and family influence behavior would 
be strengthened by analysis of longitudinal data that links past expectations and attitudes 
with future career outcomes. 
A final avenue for future research would be to expand the scope of this sample to 
include other subpopulations. I took inspiration from Mignon Moore’s (2011) analysis of 
parenting in black lesbian couples in which she uses observations of a very particular 
group of women to advance our understanding of how couples negotiate parenting 
responsibility. Female-breadwinner households provided an interesting case in my 
analysis because they break from the traditionally defined household responsibilities for 
men and women. Subgroups like female-breadwinner households are not necessarily 
representative of the population, but they provide a case where we can test if, under 
specific circumstances, gender inequalities in childcare, earnings, or other areas can be 
reduced or eliminated. Cohabiting couples with children provide another interesting 
subpopulation for studying the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium as well as 
gender disparities in childcare. I excluded cohabiting couples from the 2008 SIPP 
analysis sample data and the survey experiment instructed respondents to imagine a 
future in which they were married. We know that there are differences between couples 
in married and cohabiting relationships on factors like union length and relationship 
quality (Jose, O’Leary, and Moyer 2010), demographic makeup of both groups including 
differences in race, class, and educational background (Goodwin, Mosher, and Chandra 
2010), and investment in the relationship (Poortman and Mills, 2012). Cohabiting couples 
provide an interesting opportunity to test the impacts of investment in intimate 
relationships and expectations of union duration on the motherhood penalty and 
fatherhood premium and gendered division of childcare. Future research should continue 
to look for instances where the gender pay gap and gendered division of household labor 
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could be reduced or eliminated to increase our understanding of both the structural and 
social contributors to gender inequality. 
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Appendix 1: Experimental Prompt 
[Description of Manipulations: The prompt was divided into three sections. 
Section One was presented to all participants. Section Two contained the amount 
manipulation. The high amount condition was included the first set of words within the 
parentheses, and the low amount condition was included the second set of words within 
the parentheses. The amount control conditions excluded this section. Section Three 
contained the quality manipulations. The “But” transition in parentheses was included in 
the high amount/low quality and the low amount/high quality conditions. Similar to 
Section Two, in Section Three the high quality condition was included the first set of 
words within the parentheses and the low quality condition was included the second set 
of words within the parentheses. The quality control conditions excluded this section.] 
 
[PROMPT TEMPLATE] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. [Section Two: Amount Manipulation] Your 
husband (does most of the/does very little) childcare. When you get home from work, 
you find that you can (always/rarely) count on your husband to participate in the dinner, 
bath, and bed time routines. [Section Three: Quality Manipulation] (But) When he takes 
care of the kids, you think that he (does/does not do) a good job: he (keeps track 
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of/sometimes forgets) play dates, (makes sure homework gets finished/doesn’t always 
remember to check homework), and (knows/doesn’t know) what to do when one of the 
kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 1: HIGH AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When 
you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to 
participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. When he takes care of the kids, you 
think that he does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets 
finished, and knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 2: HIGH AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
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children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When 
you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to 
participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. But when he takes care of the kids, 
you think that he does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn’t always 
remember to check homework, and doesn’t know what to do when one of the kids gets 
sick. 
 
[CONDITION 3: HIGH AMOUNT, NO QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. Your husband does most of the childcare. When 
you get home from work, you find that you can always count on your husband to 
participate in the dinner, bath, and bed time routines.  
 
[CONDITION4: LOW AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
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for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you 
get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in 
the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. But when he takes care of the kids, you think that 
he does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets finished, and 
knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 5: LOW AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you 
get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in 
the dinner, bath, and bed time routines. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he 
does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn’t always remember to 
check homework, and doesn’t know what to do when one of the kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 6: LOW AMOUNT, NO QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
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Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. Your husband does very little childcare. When you 
get home from work, you find that you can rarely count on your husband to participate in 
the dinner, bath, and bed time routines.  
 
[CONDITION 7: NO AMOUNT, HIGH QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he 
does a good job: he keeps track of play dates, makes sure homework gets finished, and 
knows what to do when one of the kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 8: NO AMOUNT, LOW QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
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middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school. When he takes care of the kids, you think that he 
does not do a good job: he sometimes forgets play dates, doesn’t always remember to 
check homework, and doesn’t know what to do when one of the kids gets sick. 
 
[CONDITION 9: NO AMOUNT, NO QUALITY] 
We are interested in learning about how people think about their jobs and careers.  
 
Please imagine that several years from now you are married with one child in 
preschool and one child in 2nd grade. Both you and your husband work in full-time 
middle-management jobs outside of the home. You have similar salaries and possibilities 
for promotion. You and your husband do all of the housework and take care of the 
children when they are not in school.  
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Appendix 2: Survey Instrument 
Given the scenario that you just read about, please answer the following questions 
about your attitudes toward work. Please answer as if you were in the situation you just 
read about. [Answer choices for Q1-4: Likert scale from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 
“Strongly Agree.] 
 
1. I would be willing to work overtime to help my boss in a crunch.  
2. If I were to have another child, I would want to take off 4 months or more 
from work.  
3. If my child was sick, I would rather my husband be the parent to miss 
work. 
4. I would take a promotion that required me to work 5 additional hours each 
week.  
 
5. If you were in the scenario you just read about, how many hours a week 
would you ideally like to work? [Answer choice for Q5: enter a number of 
hours ranging from 0-168] 
 
Thinking back to the scenario you just read about, please answer these questions 
about your attitudes toward work. Again, please answer as if you were in the situation 
you just read about. [Answer choices for Q6-9: Likert scale from 1 “Strongly Disagree” 
to 7 “Strongly Agree”] 
 
6. I would be ambitious at work.  
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7. Being promoted at work would be important to me. 
8. Moving into a higher management or executive position at work would be 
important to me.  
9. I would be very dissatisfied with my job as whole. 
 
10. Now we would like to ask you about stress. Stress means a situation in 
which a person feels tense, restless, nervous or anxious or is unable to 
sleep at night because his/her mind is troubled all the time. Thinking back 
to the situation described in the scenario, how much stress do you think 
you would feel? [Answer choices for Q10: Likert scale from 1 “None” to 
7 “A Great Deal”] 
 
Now we would like to ask about how you would divide your time in the scenario 
you just read. Please move the slider to indicate how you think you would divide your 
time. [Answer choices for Q11-12: slider with a 100-point scale with 0 indicating “All 
time spent on work” and 100 indicating “All time spent on childcare”] 
 
11. Considering the situation described in the prompt, how do you think you 
would divide your time between childcare and work?  
12. If you had complete control over your schedule, how would you like to 
divide your time between childcare and work?  
 
13. Thinking back to the scenario you read about, how much help did your 
husband provide in terms of childcare? (1 “Husband does not do any 
childcare”, 2” Husband does less childcare than you do”, 3 “You and your 
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husband evenly split the childcare”, 4 “Husband Does more childcare than 
you do”, 5 “Husband does most of the childcare”) 
 
14. Thinking back to the scenario you read about, rate the quality of the 
childcare your husband provided. (1 “Poor”, 2 “Fair”, 3 “Good”, 4 “Very 
Good”, 5 “Excellent”) 
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